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MADNESS ALONE PUNISHES THE MADMAN*:
THE SEARCH FOR MORAL DIGNITY IN THE
COURT'S COMPETENCY DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN
CAPITAL CASES
J. AMY DILLARD··
"[Criminal] proceedings must not only be fair, they must 'appear fair to all
who observe them. ",1

The purposes of the competency doctrine are to guarantee reliability in
criminal prosecutions, to ensure that only those defendants who can
appreciate punishment are subject to it, and to maintain moral dignity, both
actual and apparent, in criminal proceedings. No matter his crime, the
"madman" should not be forced to stand trial. Historically, courts viewed
questions of competency as a binary choice, finding the defendant either
competent or incompetent to stand trial. However, in Edwards v. Indiana,
the Supreme Court conceded that it views competency on a spectrum and
offered a new category of competency-borderline-competent. The Court
held that borderline-competent defendants may proceed to trial so long as
they are represented by counsel. This Article examines borderlinecompetent defendants in the context of capital prosecution and argues that
those defendants, like mentally retarded defendants, pose a special risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors that may call for a less
severe penalty. In the death penalty context where the proceedings are
complex, the risks are enormous, and the demand for moral dignity is
greatest, using competent counsel as a proxy for the capital defendant's
competency violates the defendant's due process rights. This Article

* See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 ("[F]uriosus furore solum
punitur [madness alone punishes the madman]").
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D.,
Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., Wellesley College.
I thank Joe McCarthy, my long-standing co-counsel in a complex capital case, for
his years of collaboration in thinking about competency to stand trial in new, innovative
ways; the University of Baltimore School of Law for generously supporting this scholarship
and to my colleagues for engaging with me in a scholarship talk during the drafting process;
Greg Wiercioch, my former law schoolmate and current counsel for Scott Panetti, for his
generosity of time and extensive knowledge about Panetti's case and capital defense in
general; Professors Penny Pether and David Caudill for their unwavering support and
guidance; Katie Walsh and Katie Villareale, for their dedicated assistance with research;
Cheryl Jones, for her many talents; and Karen Woody.
1. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (quoting Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)).
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maintains that those defendants who are incompetent to proceed to trial
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INTRODUCTION

What if Jared Lee Loughner can never be restored to competency to
stand trial for the capital murder of a federal judge and other crimes,
including the attempted murder of Congresswoman Gabrielle GifIords?2 By
all accounts of his behavior and mental state,3 he would meet Blackstone's

2. See Adam Nagourney, A Single Terrifying Moment: Shots, a Scuffle, Some Luck,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at AI. Loughner's case is pending before the United States
District Court but is on appeal on the issue of forcible medication to restore him to
competency. See United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, D.C. No. 4:II-cr00187-LAB-l (order dated July, 12,2011) (holding that Loughner should not be subjected to
forcible psychotropic medication while the Ninth Circuit considers whether the district court
properly ordered forcible medication to restore him to competency).
3. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson et aI., Suspect's Odd Behavior Caused Growing Alarm,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A12 (detailing Loughner's disturbing behavior before the
crime); Marc Lacey, Suspect in Shooting o/Giffords Ruled Unfit/or Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May
25,2011, at A2 (describing the disorganized thinking and chronic delusions of Loughner at
the time of a pre-trial hearing during which he was disruptive and nonsensical).
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definition of a 1unatic4 and, thus, would have been spared from prosecution
based on the incompetency doctrine at the time of the founding of the
United States. s Even if Loughner can be restored to a level of borderline
competency,6 would there be any moral dignity in his prosecution and
execution? This Article maintains that exposing a borderline-competent
capital defendant to a death sentence does not satisfy the moral dignity
aspect of due process even if the defendant has competent counsel to
"function as [an) instrument and defender of the client's autonomy and
dignity in all phases of the criminal process.,,7
Even though our standards today are more compassionate8 towards
those criminal defendants who suffer from mental illness or mental defect9
and have moved in the direction 10 of pathos for mental illness, the
unrestorably incompetent capital defendant has largely become a thing of
the pastil since the Court handed down its decision in Jackson v. Indiana l2

4. A contemporary synonym for lunacy is psychosis, a condition that medical
professionals identify by the presence of symptoms. Commonly, Schizophrenia,
Schizoaffective Disorder, and several other permutations of spectrum are classified as
psychotic diseases. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 297 (4th ed. 2000). Throughout this Article, I equate
Blackstone's lunatics with today's seriously mentally ill defendant.
5. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 ("[I]diots and lunatics are not
chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not even for
treason itself.").
6. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (using the classifications
"borderline-competent" and "gray-area" competent to describe those defendants who are
competent to stand trial so long as they are represented by counsel).
7. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."). Due process requires
that courts approach the marginally competent defendant with great care, notwithstanding
the vigorous debate over the place of the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine in Eighth
Amendment analysis. See id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 315 (majority opinion) (discerning that society was evolving in the
direction of exempting mentally retarded defendants from execution).
10. The Court generally looks for social change as working in one direction and
reconciles movement to two opposing directions in the light most favorable to the defendant.
The best example comes from Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), in which the
Court reconciled society's exemption of non-homicide offenses from death-eligibility with
society's increasing interest in prosecuting child molesters. The Court chose the path that
favored the defendant. Id. at 427-29.
II. The data on unrestorable capital defendants are not compiled by anyone, but
through extensive inquiry by email with the leading capital defenders and scholars in the
United States, I have uncovered only two capital defendants who have not been restored to
competency. They are Gregory Murphy, my current client, who was charged with capital

464

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:461

in 1972. In that case, the Court found a violation of due process in the
common practice of indefinitely holding unrestorably incompetent
defendants, which effectively doomed such defendants to life sentences.
The Jackson Court ordered that such defendants either be civilly committed
or released from pre-trial criminal detention. I3 By 1972, psychotropic
medication made it possible for some seriously mentally ill defendants to
achieve competency. The holding in Jackson forced the state to undertake
rigorous efforts to restore a defendant's competency or release the
defendant from the criminal system into the civil mental health system. 14
In response to Jackson, some states inserted tolling provisions into their
scant legislation governing incompetent defendants. Most of the postJackson provisions provide for the civil commitment of the unrestorably
incompetent defendant following a period of time during which mental
health professionals might make reasonable efforts to restore the defendant
to fitness for trial. 15 In most states, a criminal defendant who has been
deemed unrestorably incompetent can be civilly committed after the
dismissal of criminal charges and is subject to confinement only under the
mental health standards of the state, typically, so long as the patient poses a
risk of imminent danger to himself or to others. 16
The Jackson holding created a tension between society's need for
retribution 17 and the age-old doctrine that the prosecution of an incompetent

murder in Alexandria, Virginia, in 2000 and remains incompetent to stand trial, and Russell
Weston, the Capitol Hill shooter, who was indicted in 1998 and remains incompetent to
stand trial.
12. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1971).
13. Id at 720.
14. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 10-617 (West 2011).
15. S~e, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106 (West 2011) (authorizing the
release of incompetent defendants charged with non-violent crimes and the civil
commitment of those charged with violent crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 (West
2011) (setting a five year tolling period for efforts at restoration to competency for all
criminal defendants except those charged with capital murder).
16. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-617 (West 2011) (authorizing civil
commitment for citizens who have a mental disorder and present a danger to others); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-817 (West 2011) (authorizing civil commitment where there is a
substantial likelihood that a person in the near future will cause serious physical harm to self
or others as evidenced by behavior or suffers serious harm due to lack of capacity to protect
self from harm or provide for basic human needs).
17. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 D.C. DAVIS L. REv. Ill, 113 (2007) (arguing
that contemporary trends in punishment show a blood thirst for longer sentences under harsh
prison conditions); R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and
the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 459, 465-66 (1994)
(theorizing that some defendants have less capacity to bear moral responsibility and should,
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defendant serves no purpose.1 8 In the vast majority of criminal cases,
unrestorab1y incompetent defendants face significantly longer tenns of
confinement as a result of civil commitments than they might have endured
19
if they had been found competent, gone to trial, and been sentenced. As a
result of the probable difference in terms of confinement for civil
commitments and criminal convictions, scholars, defense attorneys, and the
Court have crafted noble interpretations of the competency doctrine--first
articulated in Dusky v. United StateiO-that allow for defendants with the
barest of competency, the "marginally competent,,,21 to stand trial or plead
guilty and to then face whatever punishment the court imposes. This
interpretation of what it means to be competent to stand trial gives the
defendant the choice to confront the determinate criminal system and its
confinement penalty rather than to suffer the indeterminate civil system.22

therefore, be punished differently).
18. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24. Blackstone offers trial-related reasons for the
doctrine, such as the incompetent defendant's lack of caution and advice in entering a plea,
his inability to present a defense, and his inability to raise claims of innocence even after his
trial. Jd.; see Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,960 (2007) ("Gross delusions stemming
from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its
punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper
purpose.").
19. The best example might be the defendant who is charged with a non-violent
misdemeanor, like trespassing, for which he might expect to serve no more than a few days
in jail, if convicted. If that defendant is referred for a competency evaluation, he would
likely be confined for the time necessary to complete the evaluation, and if he was found
incompetent, he could expect to be detained for up to twelve months (the typical statutory
maximum for a misdemeanor) while the hospital tried to restore him to competency. If the
hospital found him unrestorably incompetent, he would be civilly committed, which would
result in his further detention until he did not pose a risk to himself or others. Furthermore,
the defendant might never have come into contact with the civil commitment system but for
his arrest for trespassing.
20. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
21. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 427
(1990) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants]. I believe that
Professor Bonnie coined the phrase "marginally competent" in his landmark piece on
adjudicative competency and mental retardation. Jd. at 423 ("a substantial number of these
defendants are, at best, marginally competent"); see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171
(2008) (using the terms "borderline-competent" and "gray-area competent" to describe a
defendant who meets the standard for adjudicative competence but fails to meet the standard
for representational competence). I will use the term "marginally competent" throughout this
Article to refer to defendants with a serious mental illness who meet only the barest
threshold of the competence standard; mentally retarded defendants, as described in detail by
Professor Bonnie, easily fall in the same category.
22. See Bruce Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, AM.
B. FOUND. REs. 1. 769,776 (1977) [hereinafter Winick, Psychotropic Medication] (explaining
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This defendant-centered approach23 serves most criminal defendants quite
well since most achieve finality in their criminal cases and avoid
indeterminate civil commitment.
The practice for capital defendants, however, operates in the reverse:
marginally competent defendants pose a special risk "that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty.,,24 In capital cases, the prosecution has a more pressing interest in
having the defendant restored to competency, even if the competency is
merely marginal, to achieve closure for devastatingly serious crimes; on the
other hand, defense counsel often views its role as, in every ethical way
possible, standing between the defendant and certain death?5 While the
state might be satisfied with a Jackson resolution-indefinite civil
commitment-in a non-capital criminal case, the idea that a capital
defendant might dodge prosecution and punishment for the most heinous of
crimes and become eligible for release from civil commitment is
intolerable. 26 In response to the prosecutorial interest in restoring

that as legislatures put procedural safeguards in place for civil commitment, more mentally
ill citizens found themselves shuttled to the mental health system via criminal process).
23. Defendant-centered lawyering is the paramount model for criminal defenders, and
it is widely accepted as the proper approach. The best current example is the American Bar
Association, 2011 National Defender Training Program, Public Defense Plus: ClientCentered Representation and Beyond. Criminal defense attorneys work for results that are in
the best interests of their clients, but determining what "best interests" means can often be
difficult when dealing with a mentally ill client. An attorney's personal view that the client
might be well served by civil commitment and in-patient mental health treatment may not be
the client's expressed wish. The attorney is ethically bound to work towards the client's
reasonable goals. Among those duties might be "limping" a client through a guilty plea with
a small jail sentence to avoid a competency evaluation that might result in a finding of
unrestorability and a long civil commitment. See generally DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS
AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED ApPROACH (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the necessity of
client-centered approach and encouraging active client participation).
24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586,605 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Professor Bonnie asserts that the fairness of adjudication for marginally competent
defendants "depends largely on the ability and inclination of the attorney to recognize and to
compensate for the client's limitations." See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants, supra note 21, at 423. Put another way, the defendant-centered approach in a
capital case with a seriously mentally ill defendant might entail strenuous arguments that the
defendant is unrestorably incompetent and should be civilly committed rather than
compensating for the client's limitations. See John D. King, Candor, Zeal. and the
Substitution ofJudgment: Ethics and the Mentally III Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REv.
207, 258 (2008) (exploring the role of the criminal defense attorney as surrogate decision
maker for the incompetent client).
26. The Court's defendant-specific, desert-based, proportionality jurisprudence, which
exempts juveniles and the mentally retarded from execution, protects those groups of
defendants in ways that the death-qualified jury would not. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
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competence, hospitals have developed treatment regimens that answer the
call of a rule of law rather than of science,27 and trial courts have pushed
more seriously mentally ill capital defendants to tria1. 28
Until recently, the Court had expressed its competence to stand trial
doctrine as a binary with the defendant categorized as either competent or
incompetent. 29 However, in Indiana v. Edwards,30 the Court recognized a
spectrum of competence that included "borderline-competent" and "grayarea" competent defendants? I The Court concluded that borderline32
competent defendants could achieve adjudicative competence and proceed
33
to trial even when they could not achieve representational competence to

551 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (holding that mentally retarded defendants are less
culpable and are more at risk of an unjustified death sentence) (emphasis added). See
generally Pamela A. Wilkins, Competency for Execution: The Implications of a
Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 TENN. L. REV. 713,765-66 (2009) (explaining that
retributive theory has two prongs: desert theory and communicative theory).
27. See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert
Trilogy Need To Know about the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical-and Not Just the
Methodological-Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2003); David S. Caudill, Lacan and
the Discourse of Science in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2331 (2003) (explaining how science
is idealized in law).
28. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399,404 (1986).
29. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,402 (1960) (per curiam).
30. 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
31. See id. at 176 (accepting that borderline-competent or gray-area competent
defendants may suffer "disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and
concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe
mental illness") (quoting Brief for the American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 26). The holding in Edwards is contrary to Justice
Kennedy's assertion in a concurring opinion in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), that
due process does not demand that trial courts apply more than one standard of competence
for different aspects and decisions in the trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 184.
32. Adjudicative competence is an umbrella term used to cover the defendant's ability
to understand and participate in general trial matters. General trial matters include pleading
guilty or standing trial and the decisions attendant to those paths; pursuing appeals; and
waiving Miranda rights when testifying. See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES:
FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 3 (2d ed. 2003). Decisional, representational, and
executional competence have all been devised and developed in the post-Jackson era, and I
address those nuances in Part III.
33. Lea Johnston coined the phrase representational competence to describe the
"competency standard for self-representation at trial." See E. Lea Johnston, Setting the
Standard: A Critique of Bonnie's Competency Standard and the Potential of ProblemSolving Theory for Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1605, 1609 (2010)
[hereinafter Johnston, Setting the StandardJ. Like Professor Johnston, I employ the term
only to "capture those abilities that a court should require a defendant to possess in order to
represent himself at trial." See id. at 1609 n.24.
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waive counsel and represent themselves at trial. Using the spectrum of
competence that the Court set out in Edwards, this Article argues that
marginally competent capital defendants should be categorically exempted
from execution for many of the same reasons that mentally retarded 34
defendants are categorically exempted from execution.
Although the Court did not provide a specific definition 35 of borderlinecompetent or gray-area competent defendants in Edwards, it did offer some
insight by listing conditions that might prevent a defendant from proceeding
pro se. 36 The Court expressed concern for the defendant's overall mental
condition and mental fitness, his level of decision-making powers, his
expressive ability and communication skills, and his disorganized
thinking. 37 The National Institutes of Mental Health has defined the
seriously mentally ill citizen as one whose only hope for successful
treatment rests on anti-psychotic medication. 38
Because capital trials are markedly different from all other criminal
trials due to their complexity, capital defendants need to possess a higher
degree of competency to proceed. 39 The capital trial requires a nuanced
understanding of the bifurcated sentencing proceeding; an ability to work,

34. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded
defendants must be categorically exempted from execution because they are categorically
less culpable and pose a special risk of suffering unacceptable trial prejudice).
35. Professor Lea Johnston has undertaken to define the scope of representational
competency. See E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the
Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 523, 571 (2011) [hereinafter
Johnston, Representational Competence] (theorizing that a defendant has adequate reasoning
ability ifhe can justify his "selection of a defense with a single reason capable of evidentiary
support in the world as we understand it"). I admire Professor Johnston's work, but having
spent the past decade representing a seriously mentally ill capital defendant, my experience
teaches that the complexity of representing a mentally ill defendant reaches well beyond the
scope of his reasoning ability. Representing a capital client who harbors paranoia towards
counsel, ignores simple advice about not communicating with the prosecution or the court
about the pending charges, makes decisions based on the convoluted construct of the
intricate circuitry of the individual manifestations of his mental illness, and is simply unable
to concentrate, communicate, and comprehend places a burden on counsel that exceeds the
bounds of moral dignity in a capital prosecution. I assert that the issue may never be
resolved by using a rubric or a test but, instead, will require the trial court to ensure that
moral dignity fills the capital courtroom.
36. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76.
37. See id. (showing concern for "disorganized thinking, deficits in sustammg
attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common
symptoms of severe mental illness" when determining decisional competence).
38. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 14-15 (1984).
These citizens suffer hallucinations, delusions, and thought and movement disorders.
39. Put another way, the marginally competent, borderline-competent, and gray-area
defendants will never be competent enough for a capital trial where death is a possible
sentence.
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both intellectually and emotionally, with several attorneys, investigators,
mitigation experts, forensic experts, and a host of mental health
professionals; a keen sense of strategy; and the ability to set aside common
approaches to criminal trials, such as arguing innocence, in favor of legal
strategies, such as trying to convince the jury to sentence the defendant to
life in prison. Because of the demands of a capital trial, a defendant who
lacks the decision-making powers for self-representation at a non-capital
trial will also lack the degree of competence necessary to engage in the
many activities required of the capital defendant.
But more importantly, "death is different,'.40 and the possibility of death
should imbue the competency doctrine as applied to capital cases with a
conscious consideration of moral dignity.4 The capital trial and death
sentence of a borderline-competent defendant, even one who is represented
by counsel, could result in an unfair trial for many of the same reasons that
the capital trial of a mentally retarded defendant could result in an unfair
tria1. 42 The Supreme Court's categorical exclusion of juvenile defendants
and mentally retarded defendants from execution-a status that I call
"incompetent for execution,.43-offers insight into the moral dignity44

40. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986).
41. Id. American courts often view moral dignity through the societal lens and focus
on ways that the appearance of dignity might assure actual dignity. See Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) ("[T]he Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential
interest in assuring that the defendant's trial is a fair one."); Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (noting that proceedings must not only be fair, but must "appear fair to
all who observe them").
42. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002) ("Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically
poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of
remorse for their crimes.").
43. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340; J. Amy
Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical Exemption of
Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 RICH. L. REv. 961, 968-81 (2011)
[hereinafter Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion]. I use the term "incompetent" to
describe juvenile and mentally retarded capital defendants because I think that is the proper
understanding of the Court's current defendant-specific proportionality doctrine.
44. For the purposes of this Article, when I use the phrase "moral dignity," I am
referring directly to one of Professor Bonnie's three justifications-dignity, reliability, and
autonomy-for excusing incompetent defendants from trial. See Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants, supra note 21, at 426; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 539, 551 (1993) [hereinafter
Bonnie, Beyond Dusky]. I am also incorporating the Court's constitutional conception of
human dignity as expressed in Atkins and Roper; in both cases the Court draws from
international and foreign law to craft its holding that executing juvenile and mentally
retarded capital defendants violates the Eighth Amendment. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575;
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.21. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill":
American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86
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component of the competency doctrine that is often lost in contemporary
scholarship.45
This Article addresses the lost moral dignity imperative in capital
prosecutions of marginally competent defendants. 46 Part I offers an
overview of the history of the adjudicative competence doctrine. Part II
reviews the prohibition on indefinite pre-trial detention within the
landscape of long-term asylum care in the United States. Part III evaluates
the development of policy and treatment that has resulted in an increase of
seriously mentally ill defendants confronting prosecution. Part IV explores
the Court's doctrine for categorically exempting mentally retarded capital
defendants from execution and argues that the marginally competent capital
defendant bears a striking resemblance to the mildly mentally retarded
capital defendant, especially insofar as both types may have trouble
obtaining a fair trial. In conclusion, Part V offers a resolution to the conflict
that protects the moral dignity of our criminal process without wholly
excusing the conduct of the seriously mentally ill capital defendant.
Our entire philosophy of punishment is based on the notion that
criminal defendants understand both why they are being punished47 and the

B.U. L. REv. 1335, 1413-14 (2006) (asserting that the Court should consider foreign law in
its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment).
45. Recent scholarship examining the competency doctrine focuses heavily on the
defendant's decision-making abilities and the nuances of his capacity for rational and
emotional understanding. See, e.g., Joanmarie lIaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally
Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 313 (2009); Johnston, Setting the Standard, supra note 33;
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the Criminal
Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1375, 1376 (2006).
46. I like to think that I might be picking up where Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice
Wiley Rutledge, and Charles Hamilton Houston left off in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463 (1946). See Jose Felipe Anderson, The Criminal Justice Principles afCharles Hamilton
Houston: Lessons in Innovation, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 313, 315 (2006). In Fisher, the Court
considered, among other issues, whether to accept gradations of the classifications of sanity
beyond the binary choice of sane or insane, where the defendant was beset by erratic
behavior on the day of the crime and was overtaken by a deranged mental condition after his
victim called him a "black nigger." Fisher, 328 U.S. at 477,479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, warned that a "shocking crime puts law to its severest test,"
and that no execution should be authorized by society "without the most careful observance
of its own safeguards against the misuse of capital punishment." Id. at 477 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rutledge added, in a separate dissent, that "[a] revolting crime . . .
requires unusual circumspection for its trial, so that dispassionate judgment may have sway
over the inevitable tendency of the facts to introduce prejudice or passion into the
judgment." Id. at 494 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Houston made a practice of accepting the
most difficult criminal cases, especially capital cases where the facts were particularly
heinous and the lack of due process might be expected.
47. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 404-06 (1958).
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process by which courts conduct theirs trials. Institutionalized retribution
serves no purpose when the punished cannot comprehend the complexity of
the process or the significance of their punishment. 48 While many scholars
have pushed for ways to get more marginally competent defendants into the
courtroom, considerations for the capital defendant must be different.49 My
scholarship has a narrow focus in that I examine the issues surrounding a
defendant's competency only in the setting of a capital trial where a
sentence of death is a possibility. In my view, most of the concerns that I
raise could be avoided if the trial court declared the capital defendant to be
not death-eligible;50 put another way, the trial court could find that the
marginally competent capital defendant is not competent to stand trial
where death is a possibility51 but is competent to stand trial where the most

48. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea: Clues to the
Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J. 425, 43341 (1964).
49. Concern for client autonomy is a fatal strategy in capital defense, and I confess
that I take a maternalistic approach to capital defense of marginally competent defendants.
See, e.g., Lisa Kim Anh Nguyen, Comment, In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and
the Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendant, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 597, 598 (2005)
(arguing that the implications of a lifetime of confinement while incompetent without the
possibility of restoration are worse for the defendant than being tried while incompetent).
50. Accepting that a defendant may be "marginally competent" and, thus, not eligible
for a death sentence would follow in the defendant-specific proportionality tradition that the
Court has crafted in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 572-75 (2005). Like sparing the mildly mentally retarded from execution, the
Court could similarly exclude the "marginally competent" from a capital trial where death is
a possible sentence. The costs associated with the capital punishment exist only where the
death penalty is a potential sentence. Exempting some capital defendants from deatheligibility would save a great deal of tax dollars. See generally George Skelton, Repeal the
Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2011, at A2 (detailing why a pro-capital punishment
citizen should seek repeal of the death penalty in California).
51. This is a distinction that would be clear to any judge, prosecutor, or defense
attorney involved in a capital case, but likely deserves more explanation here. The charge of
capital murder carries two potential sentences-life or death. The crime of capital murder is
distinct from other murders in that it usually involves an additional element of proof from
the government, like the murder of a child or of a police officer. See, e.g., Omar Randi
Ebeid, Comment, Death by Association: Conspiracy Liability and Capital Punishment in
Texas, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1831, 1859, 1859 n.201 (noting that, in Arizona, determining
whether a crime is punishable by death relies upon a showing of at least one aggravating
factor, such as the murder of a police officer). Under Atkins, a mentally retarded defendant
could proceed to trial for capital murder but, if guilty, could only be sentenced to life in
prison. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Criminal attorneys sometimes refer to this as "taking
death off of the table." For a recent example of a trial judge removing death as a possible
penalty, see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., Judge Rules Out Death Penalty in Police Shooting Case,
CHARLOITEOBSERVER, Aug. 24,2010.
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severe potential sentence is life without the possibility of parole. 52 I realize
that this is a narrow solution, but it is one that satisfies my scholarly agenda
in exploring ways to delimit the capital defendants who are death-eligible. I
admire the scholars who take capital punishment scholarship and apply it
more broadly to other classes of defendants;53 I am, however, resolutely
focused on the issues as they affect the capital trial and the capital
defendant.
I. A HISTORY OF THE ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCY REQUIREMENT

Historically, idiots and lunatics have been spared from criminal trials.
Because incompetent criminals could neither participate in, nor appreciate
the consequences of, criminal proceedings, their prosecution and
subsequent punishment failed to serve any purpose. 54 Little has been written
on how courts determined lunacy5 in the early days of the United States,
but Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Virginia offers a parallel
overview of the definition and treatment of mentally retarded defendants,
known as "idiots," at the time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment. 56 In
1791, '''idiots[], enjoyed ... special status under the law at that time. They,
like lunatics, suffered a 'deficiency in will' rendering them unable to tell
right from wrong.,,57 According to Justice Scalia, "idiots" were excused

52. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (holding that mentally retarded defendants shall be
categorically exempted from execution).
53. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1162,
1205 (2008) ("A uniform approach under which all criminal defendants get the same
substantive sentencing rights under the Eighth Amendment would put the Court's sentencing
jurisprudence back into the constitutional mainstream."). See generally Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that a sentence oflife without the possibility of parole for a
juvenile who has committed a non-homicide offense constitutes a violation of the Eighth
Amendment).
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24 ("[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for
their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities; no, not even for treason itself.").
55. A contemporary synonym for lunacy is psychosis, a condition that is identified by
the presence of symptoms. Commonly, Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, and several
other permutations of spectrum are classified as psychotic diseases. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
297 (4th ed. 2000). When using the term lunatic, I mean no disrespect to those who suffer
from mental illness; when possible, I try to use the modem description, seriously mentally
ill, rather than the historical term.
56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24). Justice Scalia's primary objection to
the majority opinion in Atkins is that the "idiots" of yesterday would be only the severely or
profoundly mentally retarded today. He objects to the "evolving standards of decency,"
which would give mildly mentally retarded defendants the same "special status under the
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from guilt and spared from punishment, either death or incarceration. 58
Given the wealth of literature on the deep intolerance and abject fear that
that the colonists had for the pagan beliefs of Native Americans and the
belief that any unusual conduct suggested witchcraft,59 it is easy to imagine
that any of the classic symptoms of severe mental illness-auditory and
visual hallucinations, delusions, fixed false beliefs-might have resulted in
a trial court declaring that a defendant was a lunatic. 60
William Blackstone, a primary source for American constitutional
henneneutics, detailed the need for a competency inquiry at various stages
of the trial and punishment, for if the defendant became incompetent at any
stage, the trial and punishment should not proceed.61 The primary goal of
the incompetency doctrine was to protect criminal defendants from being
tried in their absence. 62 Early common law prosecution occurred without

law" enjoyed, historically, by only the most severely mentally retarded defendants. See id. at
340-41.
58. Id. at 340 ("Due to their incompetence, idiots were 'excuse[d] from the guilt, and
of course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of
the senses.' Instead, they were often committed to civil confinement or made wards of the
State, thereby preventing them from 'go[ing] loose, to the terror of the king's subjects.'"
(quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *25) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989))); SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 11-14 (3d
ed. 1985); 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *33 (1736).
59. See generally RICHARD FRANCIS, JUDGE SEWALL'S APOLOGY: THE SALEM WITCH
TRIALS AND THE FORMING OF AN AMERICAN CONSCIENCE (HarperCollins 2005).
60. Defining the contours of early American prejudice towards "the other" is beyond
the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that most of the settlers had little use for
reflexive sociology as a means to understanding otherness. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU
& LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (U. Chi. Press 1992);
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, OTHERWISE THAN BEING (Duquesne U. Press 2002). The small Quaker
community held different views. See generally THOMAS HAMM, THE QUAKERS IN AMERICA
(Columbia Univ. Press 2003).
61. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24 (citing HALE, supra note 58, at *34).
62. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Caleb Foote, A
Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832,834
(1960)); Bruce Winick, Reforming Incompetency To Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A
Restated Proposal and Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571,
574 (1995) [hereinafter Winick, Reforming Incompetency] (explaining the common law rule
against trials in absentia). Professors Richard Bonnie and Bruce Winick spent more than a
decade in scholarly conversation about the competency doctrine and its justifications. Both
agree that society's need for reliability in the criminal process is the dominant justification
for its continued use. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 543-44; Bruce J. Winick,
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 954-55 (1985) [hereinafter
Winick, Restructuring Competency]. For the most part, when I refer to "reliability" in this
article, both in the competency context and in the death penalty context, I am referring to the
reliability of the jury's finding that death is an appropriate sentence rather than focusing on
the nearly-irrelevant issue of reliability in the guilt determination. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438
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defense counsel, so at that time, trial courts had to assess the defendant's
ability to participate in the adversarial criminal trial. 63 The defendant who
could not enter a plea or adequately argue his case against counsel for the
Crown was spared from trial. 64 The prevailing belief was that if a man
committed a capital offense and then became mad before his arraignment,
the court ought not arraign him because he would be lacking in caution and
"advice" to enter a plea.(55 Likewise, if the defendant entered a plea while
competent but then became incompetent before or during his trial, the court
should stop the trial since the incompetent defendant would be unable to
present a defense. 66 If the defendant entered a plea and completed his trial
while competent but then became incompetent before the pronouncement of
his sentence, then the court should not pronounce any judgment. 67 And if
after judgment had been pronounced but before it had been carried out, the
defendant became of "nonsane memory/' his execution should be stayed. 68
In short, the historical due process bar to trying, sentencing, and executing
an incompetent defendant was quite clear.
As a threshold matter, to comport with the guarantee of due process,
trial courts must determine whether each criminal defendant is competent to
stand trial. 69 Unlike the insanity defense,7o which serves as a basis for
mitigation in the punishment, incompetency to stand trial serves as a
complete bar to prosecution and punishment so long as the defendant
remains incompetent. 71 In practice, trial courts routinely refer criminal
defendants who appear to suffer from mental illness for a competency

U.S. 586,605 (1978).
63. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975).
64. See id. at 823-25; I JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 341 (1883). Defendants were banned from having counsel in criminal
prosecutions, though by the mid-eighteenth century trial courts began to allow counsel in
felony cases. The ban on criminal defense counsel was abolished in England in 1836. See
Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 62, at 575 n.14.
65. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at "'24 (citing HALE, supra note 58, at "'34).
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
70. See generally WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a) (5th ed.) (setting out the
elements ofthe insanity defense).
71. Most states have a tolling provision in their competency statues to allow for a civil
commitment for a defendant who demonstrates no hope of being restored to competency.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(d) (West 2011). Holding an unrestorable defendant
for treatment to restore him to competency violates due process. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 716 (1972); J. Amy Dillard, Without Limitation: "Groundhog Day" for
Incompetent Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 1221, 1223-24 (2007) [hereinafter Dillard,
Without Limitation] (asserting that Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3(d) unconstitutionally orders
capital defendants to be held indefinitely in violation of Jackson v. Indiana).
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evaluation.72 Contrary to popular perceptions and scholarly attention, in
terms of mental illness defenses, incompetency to stand trial is profoundly
more prevalent than insanity.73 The impact of the competency to stand trial
doctrine on the criminal justice system has been enormous, with trial courts
making tens of thousands of referrals for evaluations each year. 74
There is no concrete method 75 for determining a defendant's
adjudicative competence, just as there is no single criterion for determining
competency across legal settings.76 In 1960, the Court established a flexible
two-part test in Dusky v. United States,77 and this test forms the cornerstone
of the present adjudicative competency standard. 78 Based on a forensic
evaluation of greater depth than a mere mental status exam, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant has a "rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him,,,79 and the "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding. ,,80
The Court explained the constitutional enforcement of its competency
doctrine in Pate v. Robinson, declaring that states must have procedures in
place to protect the due ~rocess right of defendants to not be forced to stand
trial while incompetent. 1 The Court has twice since extended and clarified
its competency doctrine. In Drope v. Missouri, the Court held that the trial
court must monitor the defendant's competency throughout the proceedings

72. See Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 62, at 577 (asserting that trial
courts inappropriately order virtually every mentally ill criminal defendant to undergo a
competency evaluation).
73. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 62, at 924 (maintaining that all
criminal defendants who appear mentally ill during the trial process will be referred for a
competency evaluation).
74. See generally Charles L. Scott, Commentary: A Road Map for Research in
Restoration of Competency To Stand Trial, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHlATRY & L. 36 (2003)
(outlining the proportion of patients with schizophrenia, an affective disorder, and mental
retardation who are found incompetent to stand trial).
75. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 12-13
(1980) (maintaining that the Dusky requirement that a defendant be able to "rationally
consult, assist, and comprehend" is a theoretical device).
76. See GRISSO, supra note 32, at 9. The Court's holding in Sell v. United States, 539
U.S 166, 166--69 (2003), offers an excellent example of the nuances of competency
determinations. The Court concluded that Sell could be incompetent to stand trial but
competent to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 183.
77. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see, e.g., Youtsey
v. United States, 97 F. 937, 942 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287
(S.D. Ala. 1906).
78. GRISSO, supra note 32, at 70--71.
79. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
80. Id.
8!. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,385 (1966).
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to ensure that he does not become incompetent and that failure to do so
constitutes a due process violation. 82 In Medina v. California, the Court
reaffirmed its commitment to finding a due process violation in the trial of
an incompetent defendant but found that placin§ the burden on the
defendant to prove incompetency was constitutional.
Professor Richard Bonnie has labeled ''three conceptually independent
rationales" for the modem adjudicative competency doctrine-<iignity,
reliability, and autonomy.S4 Dignity and reliability serve as justifications for
the broadest definition of competence to stand trial. For the defendants who
are incapable of grasping anl "meaningful moral understanding of
wrongdoing and punishment,"S conductin~ criminal proceedings would
"offend[] the moral dignity of the process.,,8 There is no debate that sparing
those who cannot master an understanding of the simplest aspects of the
criminal justice process is proper. 87 The reliability justification is usually
viewed through the anticipatory lens of the guilt determination and requires
that a defendant be able to provide relevant, helpful details to counsel in
furtherance of preparing a reasonable defense strategy.88
The conclusion that a defendant is competent to stand trial is based on a
question oflaw that must be addressed by the presidingjudge. 89 Trial courts

82. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).
83. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992).
84. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 21, at 426.
85. Id. at 427.
86. Id. at 426.
87. I do, however, disagree with Professor Bonnie that the "moral dignity" issue is
restricted to those who are the most incompetent. In my view, the moral dignity issue is at
the heart of every competency determination and must be the overarching concern for the
trial judge who is charged with making the determination. See infra Part V.
88. The Court had characterized the competency requirement as "fundamental to an
adversary system of justice." See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (expanding
on the Dusky Court's holding that the defendant's ability to share relevant facts with his
attorney was a requirement for a finding of competency). Of course, this is but one core
value being protected in the competency doctrine, since the Court grants no such protection
to defendants who are unable to relay the facts of their offense, because of intoxication, to
their attorney.
89. Some states, like Texas, allow for a jury. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art.
46B.051 (West 2011). However, the power of the forensic evaluator's assessment to dictate
the court's decision on competency has long been recognized. See Comments, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955) ("Despite the state of the prevailing law, the
practice in some jurisdictions in determining fitness to proceed is for the psychiatric
examiner to ask if the defendant is psychotic and, if he concludes he is, to recommend
against capacity for trial. Since prospective acquiescence is the norm, the usual result of such
recommendation is that the defendant is committed."); M. C. Slough & Paul E. Wilson,
Mental Capacity To Stand Trial, 21 U. Pm. L. REv. 593,598 (1960) (explaining that, prior
to Dusky, the presence of mental illness that demanded hospitalization was the essential
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review competency assessments prepared by forensic examiners, which
often detail the defendant's "capacities and deficits relevant to the legal
issue at hand,,,90 but the ultimate determination rests with the court. While
the Court has identified the issues that each trial court must confront in a
competency determination,91 the decision of competency to stand trial
involves issues of justice, morality, and dignity and, therefore, rests not
with the forensic evaluator but with the trial COurt. 92 The adjudicative
competency determination has always been viewed as a binary-either the
defendant is competent to stand trial or he is not competent to stand trialrather than on a spectrum, but given the Court's recent acknowledgment of
borderline-competent or gray-area competent defendants,93 consideration
must be given to whether the capital trial and execution of these defendants
maintains any moral dignity.
In the end, it is the dignity of the process-both the actual dignity and
the appearance of dignity-that drives the competency doctrine. Apparent
fairness furthers a societal interest; if the defendant acts bizarrely or
disrupts the normal courtroom proceedings, "[t]he adjudication loses its
character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his
community and becomes an invective against an insensible object.,,94 But if
that same defendant sits quietly because counsel is controlling the trial, his
capacity for participation remains well below the standard necessary for
moral dignity in the capital trial.

criterion that psychiatrists used to detennine when a defendant was not competent to stand
trial).
90. Robert A. Nicholson & Steve Norwood, The Quality of Forensic Psychological
Assessments, Reports, and Testimony: Acknowledging the Gap Between Promise and
Practice, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 9,12 (2000).
9l. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
92. See Nicholson & Norwood, supra note 90, at 12 (detailing the debate among
mental health professionals as to whether forensic assessments should reach an ultimate
conclusion on the dispositive facts or only offer observations and asserting that mental
health professionals agree that the legal conclusion is "the least important part ofthe forensic
examiners role"). Criminal defendants have a due process right to not be tried while
incompetent, and as such, the question of competency must rest with a court. See generally
Maroney, supra note 45, at 1379 (arguing that the defendant's emotional competence must
be a part of the overall adjUdicative competency assessment).
93. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171, 173-75 (2008).
94. Note, Incompetency To Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 458 (1967) [hereinafter
Note, Incompetency].
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How JACKSON V. INDIANA CHANGED THE TREATMENT OF INCOMPETENT
DEFENDANTS

Before the twentieth century, medicine and science offered little insight
into mental illness and almost no useful treatment. 95 The shift from the
ancient view that madness was supernatural to the belief that religion might
bear some relevant relation took centuries. 96 Viewing lunacy as a natural
phenomenon did not occur until the nineteenth century.97 While the
standards for insanity and incompetency are different, the lunacy of the
defendant was the key element for both in an era without any useful
treatment for the underlying condition. 98 A finding of incompetency was
not a reprieve from a life of punishment; in Blackstone's era, when courts
determined that a defendant was either an idiot or a lunatic, they might ship

95. See generally Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the
Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944)(offering an in-depth look at the state
of psychiatry and the competency to stand trial in the pre-Dusky and pre-Jackson era); David
B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental
Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 225, 225 (1992) (asserting that
mental health law originated in the early 1970s on the heels of the civil rights movement and
the "revolution in criminal procedure and prisoners' rights"). One explanation for the
consistent conflation of the legal concept of sanity and competency might be that the
defendant who was insane at the time of the offense would likely be in the throes of mental
illness at the time of the trial. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972)
("Petitioner's counsel then filed a motion for a new trial, contending that there was no
evidence that Jackson was 'insane' or that he would ever attain a status which the court
might regard as 'sane' in the sense of competency to stand trial."). As a legal term and an
affirmative defense, insanity requires a finding that the defendant suffers from a mental
defect that causes the defendant to be unable to distinguish between right and wrong. See
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a) (5th ed. 2010). Some states follow the Model Penal
Code approach, which allows the defendant to show that he suffered a mental defect that
caused him to lack the "substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw." Id.
96. See LYNN GAMWELL & NANCY TOMES, MADNESS IN AMERICA: CULTURAL AND
MEDICAL PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS BEFORE 1914 15-17 (1995) (discussing AngloAmerican traditions including supernatural and religious approaches).
97. In the nineteenth century, scientists began to explain strange, criminal behavior as
arising from a natural rather than a supernatural cause, and this realization gave way to a
broader understanding of mental illness. In the criminal context, some used mental illness as
an explanation for all criminal behavior, while others deduced that lunatics were but a small
group within the larger class of criminals. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 119 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (citing NORMAN DAIN, CONCEPTS OF
lNSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1964)).
98. See Green, supra note 95, at 272-73 (setting out the perceived difference, in the
first half of the twentieth century, between "idiot, imbeciles, and morons"-those with a
mental deficiency, and lunatics-those who suffered from paranoia, delusions, and
hallucinations).
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the defendant off to Bedlam99 where he would be subjected to ice baths,
forced vomiting, and "bleeding."loo
The idea that a defendant might be treated and restored to competency
is recent and likely coincides with the discovery of effective pharmaceutical
therapies. 101 Until 1972, when the Court decided Jackson v. Indiana, I 02
most states kept incompetent criminal defendants in indefinite detention,
holding them well beyond the maximum potential penalty for the crime
charged. l03 In Jackson, the Court found that due process forbids a state from
indefinitely holding a criminal defendant solely on the basis of
incompetency to stand tria1. 104 The Court stated that "due process requires

99. Bedlam is the general term for any lunatic asylum or madhouse. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOLUME II 126 (2d ed. 1995). The Hospital of St. Mary of Bethlehem,
also known as Bethlehem Royal Hospital, was the first known institution to attempt to care
for and treat mental i11ness, beginning around 1400, and it is the origin of the term "bedlam,"
usual\y meaning madness or chaos. Id. See generally ANNE SEXTON, To BEDLAM AND PART
WAY BACK (Houghton 1960) (where bedlam serves as a poetic metaphor for the author's
hospitalization at Westwood Lodge and Glenwood Hospital and her experience with serious
mental illness).
100. See ROBERT WIUTAKER, MAo IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE, AND THE
ENDURING MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 7-12 (perseus Publishing 2002)
(explaining the rationales for treatments that were extremely, physically harmful to patients,
including draining them of "bad blood' often resulting in death).
101. During the 1930s and 1940s, u.S. asylums engaged in numerous physical
therapies, with electro-shock therapy and lobotomies both being popular, to treat mental
i11ness. See PETER SCHRAG, MIND CONTROL 5 (1978) (highlighting these and other popular
therapies).
102. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that defendants committed based on
incompetency to stand trial "cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that
capacity in the foreseeable future"); see Dillard, Without Limitation, supra note 71, at 1223
(explaining how the Virginia General Assembly holds its incompetent capital defendants
under VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 in violation of Jackson).
103. For a comprehensive example of the typical treatment given and length of
hospitalization for incompetent criminal defendants prior to Jackson, see Comment,
Commitment to Fairview: Incompetency to Stand Trial in Pennsylvania, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
1164 (1968-1969) (detailing the practice of indefinite detention and scant efforts to restore
incompetent defendants to fitness for trial) and Patricia Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Future
Directions in the Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial, 20 Current Directions in
Psychological Science 43-47 (2011) (noting the dearth of research into the efficacy of
restoration to competency programs).
104. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 731. Jackson was an illiterate, deaf mute with low
intel\igence who presented no capacity for becoming competent to stand trial. See id. at 71718. Because the Court could find no "substantial probability" that he would become
competent in the foreseeable future, it found that due process demanded his release from the
pre-trial detention that was a part of his pending criminal charges. Id. at 738.
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that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed."I05
Prior to 1972, most of the scholarly commentary on the issue of
competencl to stand trial operated as a critique of the abuses of the
doctrine.1O In the United States, the end of long-term asylum care for
mentally ill citizens began in 1963 when President Kennedy authorized the
National Institute of Mental Health to begin developing policies and plans
for treating patients after their release from state psychiatric hospitals.lo7
During this time, hospitals appeared to treat all patients, both the civil
committees and those who had been referred by courts for competency
restoration, to restore their "soundness of mind.,,108 The lack of effective
restoration treatment programs left many incompetent defendants in the
hospital for the equivalent of a life sentence, with the hospital operating as a
shadow penal system. 109 The scholarship from the era points to an
overwhelming concern for incompetent defendants drifting in due process
limbo-neither a part of the criminal justice system nor part of the mental
health systemllo-and a compelling narrative that incompetent defendants
were simply lost in an asylum system rather than allowed into a courtroom
for trial and jailed as punishment for their crimes. I I I
The facts from United States v. Barnes ll2 offer an example of the
common abuse of the adjudicative competency requirement before Jackson.
In Barnes, the state indicted four defendants for a murder that occurred a
decade earlier; the trial court subsequently dismissed the indictment against
three of the defendants based on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
violation.113 But the court found the fourth defendant, Clarence Coons,

105. Id. at 738.
106. See, e.g., Note, Incompetency, supra note 94, at 455 ("[I]ncompetency law,
invoked in the name of fairness to the accused, has often resulted in a commitment when it is
really in his interest to have trial continue.").
107. Overcrowding and understaffing plagued state mental hospitals in the early 1960s,
and it was not uncommon for half of the patients to be committed as incompetent to stand
trial. See John H. Hess et aI., Comment, Incompetency Proceedings-Common Law, 59
MICH. L. REv. 1078, 1083 (1961).
108. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the dearth of therapeutic
goals within the Ionia State Hospital in Michigan).
109. Id. at 1088-89.
110. Id.; see generally Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927) (arguing that indefinite detention without periodic
review violated due process).
Ill. For the best overview of indefinite confinement prior to Jackson, see Grant H.
Morris & Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently
Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 D.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,3-5 (1993).
112. 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
113. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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incompetent to stand trial. Though his competency was not necessary for a
dismissal proceeding, the court disregarded the defendant's rirhts and
ordered him committed until he was restored to competencyll for the
express purpose of protecting society. I 15
In Jackson, the Court clearly sought to establish some rule that would
allow an incompetent defendant to escape a lifetime of pre-trial detention in
favor of a more humane approach. 11 6 Theon Jackson, the defendant, was a
deaf-mute when he was charged with two counts ofrobbery.II7 Jackson had
no communication skills; he could not read or write, and he was unable to
signYs The trial court ordered a competency evaluation of Jackson and
committed him to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until such time
as he was "sane" for trial. 1I9 Two doctors concluded that the "prognosis
appear[ed] rather dim,,120 and that Jackson would never become competent
to stand trial, even if he were not a deaf-mute, because his mental capacity
was that of a preschool-aged child. 121 The lack of native capacity made it
impossible for Jackson to overcome his deaf-mute handicap and
communicate with counselor understand the nature of the charges against

114. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. at 65; see Note, Incompetency, supra note 94, at 455-56
(arguing that the incompetent defendant "is denied an opportunity to prove his innocence, or
to show that the prosecution's case is defective").
115. Id. ("It must not be forgotten that underlying [the competency requirement], is the
concept of some protection to society, as well as the preservation of the rights of an accused
person.").
116. Prior to Jackson, the options for intractably incompetent defendants appeared
binary-suffer a lifetime of pre-trial detention or go to trial even while incompetent. See
Note, Incompetency, supra note 94, at 459 (arguing for a relaxed competency standard in
cases of permanent disability to allow defendants to have closure to their criminal
proceedings).
117. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717 (1967). The total value of the property
allegedly taken by Jackson during the robberies was less than $10.00, a fact that seemed
important to the Court when it decided that his indefinite pre-trial detention would likely
result in a life sentence since Jackson was unrestorably incompetent to stand trial. See id. at
717.
118. Id. at 718-19; see Eric Eckes, Comment, The Incompetency of Courts and
Legislatures: Addressing Linguistically Deprived Deaf Defendants, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1649,
1660 (2007) (setting out a method and an argument for how trial courts should assess the
competency of linguistically-challenged, deaf defendants).
119. Here, as in other cases, the Court conflates the terms of sanity and competency. No
doubt, the Jackson Court meant that the defendant needed to be competent to stand trial
rather than sane to stand trial. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718-19; see generally Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (employing the terms of sanity and competency
interchangeably throughout). A broad reading of Jackson and Ford might justify the
conclusion that the Court intends for the term sanity to have more of a lay meaning than a
legal meaning; that is, the Court uses insanity in the competency context to mean "crazy."
120. Jackson, 406 U.s. at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 717, 720.
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him and the legal proceedings. 122 The trial court ordered continued efforts
to restore Jackson to competency even though no medical evidence of that
possibility existed.
On appeal, Jackson's attorney argued that his continued pre-trial
hospitalization amounted to a life sentence since Jackson lacked the
capacity to accomplish the task-becoming competent to stand trial-that
was the predicate for his release from the hospital and entry into the
courtroom. 123 The Court held that the pre-trial detention of a defendant with
no substantial likelihood of restoration in the foreseeable future constituted
a due process violation!24 The Court also held that treating Jackson
differently from other "feeble-minded" citizens, simply because he had
been charged with a crime, constituted an equal protection violation. 125
Though the Court did not offer specifics in Jackson as to how long
incompetent defendants could be held while the state made reasonable
efforts at restoration, some states responded to the opinion by inserting a
tolling provision into their incompetency statutes 126 and creating a civil
commitment mechanism for defendants who are deemed unrestorably
incompetent. In short, after Jackson, states had a reason to order hospitals
to engage in vigorous restoration efforts 127 for incompetent defendants who
were charged with serious crimes-to ensure that those defendants were
prosecuted and punished rather than civilly committed and made eligible
for release back to the community.
The Jackson Court was highly attuned to the obvious due process
violation in Theon Jackson's case. But its solution, ordering Jackson civilly
committed rather than forcing him to trial, had undesirable side effects. As
asylums and long-term hospitals began to close and as mental health
services lost funding, hospitals began to conclude that more and more
patients, previously deemed unrestorable, were miraculously restored, and

122. See id. at 718-19 (applying tae Dusky standards).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 738.
125. Id. at 737-39. The Article's focus is due process rather than equal protection, but it
is fair to note that the Court's equal protection analysis is incomplete, at best, as the Court
nearly ignored the fact that Jackson was charged with a crime. The Court did not offer any
guidance on the dispensation of the criminal charges for an unrestorably incompetent
defendant, nor did it grapple with the complex question of whether probable cause that a
person has committed a crime might justify detaining one "feeble-minded" person
differently from another "feeble-minded" person who has not been charged with committing
a crime.
126. For example, in Virginia, non-capital defendants may be detained for no more than
five years on a felony charge while the Commonwealth engages in restoration efforts. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(D) (2008).
127. See Stephen G. Noffsinger, Restoration to Competency Practice Guidelines, 45
INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & CaMP. CRIMINOLOGY 356 (2001) (examining restoration to
competency programs for effectiveness).
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reports to the court began to reflect that these defendants were competent
for tria1. 128 The standard for competency did not change with Jackson, and
Jackson himself would have easily landed on the profoundly incompetent
end of the spectrum. But after Jackson, states that had previously held a
wide spectrum of incompetent defendants in indefinite pre-trial detention
now had a compelling reason to push marginally competent defendants into
the courtroom since they could no longer be indefinitely detained. 129
III. How COURTS AND HOSPITALS PUSHED MORE MARGlNALLY
COMPETENT DEFENDANTS lNTO COURT IN RESPONSE TO JACKSON
In Jackson, the Court articulated for the first time that the purpose of
committing a defendant who was not competent to stand trial was to
provide treatment to restore him to competency.130 Hospitals responded to
Jackson by developing a treatment regimen of medication and education, 13l
and courts developed an expanded interpretation of the Dusky standard to
allow more marginally competent defendants into the courtroom. 132 While

128. Some assert that incompetent defendants often lack an understanding of and the
resources to assert their rights under Jackson. See Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra
note 62, at 943. But this is not the case in the death penalty context where defense counsel
actively assert incompetency and are happy to live with pre-Jackson indeterminacy rather
than taking a marginally competent defendant to trial for capital murder.
129. As evidence of the state pushing marginally competent defendants to trial, jails
have become filled with inmates who are mentally ill. See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S.
Ct. 1910 (2011) (detailing the inhumane conditions for mentally ill prisoners in the
overcrowded California penal system); Katie Connolly, Mentally III Increasing Strain on
U.S. Prison System, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-us-canada-12532538 (last visited July 29, 2011) (describing the overcrowding
and lack of resources for mentally ill inmates in the Virginia penal system).
130. The facts of Jackson make it obvious that treatment had not been the accepted
purpose of the commitment prior to the Court's decision; rather, incapacitation and
separation from the community were the apparent goals. Cf United States v. Barnes, 175 F.
Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1959) ("It must not be forgotten that underlying [the competency
requirement], is the concept of some protection to society, as well as the preservation of the
rights of an accused person." (emphasis added)).
131. Competency education is beyond the scope of this Article, though I hope to tackle
that troublesome problem in a future article. One scholar has suggested that a model
competency restoration program should include an educational component, which should
strive to educate the defendant on the following: the variety and severity of his charges;
pleas, plea bargaining, and sentencing; the role of courtroom personnel; the adversarial
nature of the trial process; and the evaluation of evidence. See Noffsinger, supra note 127, at
361. Educating the defendant to answer the questions "correctly" in the competency
evaluation is not a legitimate goal of the educational component to competency restoration,
though I have witnessed two highly regarded forensic psychologists offer "model" answers
to standard competency assessment questions to an incompetent capital defendant.
132. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993) (holding that the heightened
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Jackson offered an acceptable resolution for many incompetent
defendants--civil commitment-that resolution is less appealing in cases
where the defendant has been charged with a serious crime, like capital
murder. Civil commitment statutes offer some protection that an individual
will not be released so long as he poses an imminent danger to himself or
others,133 but the decision for when and whether a patient is suitable for
release from civil commitment typically rests with the treating hospital. 134
In serious criminal cases where the court and the public have a legitimate
concern for public safety, the civil commitment of an unprosecuted,
seriously mentally ill person who stands accused of committing a heinous
crime is not a satisfacto~ result. Some states have tried to circumvent
Jackson in capital cases,13 but the sad result for a host of capital defendants
is that trial courts have found them competent to stand trial when moral
sensibility demonstrates that they were not.
A. The Example ofScott Panelli
Scott Panetti offers an example of how a trial court may have applied
the nuances of the competency doctrines in a post-Jackson capital trial and
allowed a marginally competent man to represent himself in a trial that
resulted in his death sentence. 136 Panetti' s case offers a stark example of a
trial that lacked moral dignity.

standard for pleading guilty and waiving counsel does not constitute a heightened standard
for competence).
133. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817C (2008) (allowing involuntary
commitment for a person who presents imminent threat or harm to himself or others or who
cannot protect himself from harm or care for basic needs).
134. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-837 to 38 (2008) (setting out the standards
for release from involuntary civil commitment).
135. The best example is in Virginia, where in response to a capital defendant nearing
the "tolling" date on his pre-trial detention for restoration to competency, the Virginia
General Assembly passed "the Murphy bill," referring to Gregory Murphy, charged with
capital murder in Alexandria, Virginia, and incompetent to stand trial since 2000. See VA.
CODE ANN. §19.2-169.3(F) (2008) (allowing for the indefinite detention of pre-trial capital
defendants who are not competent to stand trial); Dillard, Without Limitation, supra note 71,
at 1223 (asserting that Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3(D) unconstitutionally orders capital
defendants to be held indefinitely in violation of Jackson v. Indiana).
136. Panetti's case currently sits before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on review
from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division,
which determined, on remand from the United States Supreme Court in Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), that Scott Panetti is competent to be executed. The issue
of whether Panetti was competent to stand trial and represent himself has been joined with
the executional competency issue on review, since the Court's decision in Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), has raised the new claim for Panetti. Most of the details
provided in this Article on the procedural posture ofPanetti's case and the factual details of
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Panetti's pre-trial competency evaluation revealed that Panetti suffered
from "fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations.,,137 Prior to
trial, he was hospitalized several times for his mental disorders and was
prescribed medication so potent that a person without extreme psychosis
could not have tolerated it. 138 Evidence revealed that even when taking his
prescribed medication, Panetti believed that the devil possessed his home
and that he had to enga~e in bizarre cleansing rituals that included burying
valuables in the yard. 13 The trial court evaluated this and other evidence
and, against the wishes of defense counsel, Panetti's family, and the
prosecution, found Panetti competent to stand trial. 140
Several months before the start of his trial, Panetti stopped taking his
prescribed anti-psychotic medication. 141 The trial court did not re-assess
Panetti's competency to stand trial during the pre-trial period or the trial,
thus leaving unresolved the issue of how Panetti's discontinuation of his
medication had "exacerbate[dl the underlying mental dysfunction.,,142 At
trial, with standby counsel, l Panetti represented himself against two
counts of capital murder. l44 During the trial, Panetti acted bizarrely before

the crime, prosecution, appeal, and habeas proceedings come directly from Greg Wiercioch,
counsel of record for Panetti. See Author's Notes, dated June 23, 2011 (on file with
Tennessee Law Review).
137. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936. I assert that the trial court's finding that Panetti was
competent to stand trial and represent himself was in error.
138. Id. (citing App. 233). One doctor testified, "I can't imagine anybody getting that
dose waking up for two to three days. You cannot take that kind of medication if you are
close to normal without absolutely being put out."
139. Id. at 936.
140. While the court will, necessarily, rely on testimony from witnesses with expertise
in the field of mental illness and forensic psychology, the ultimate decision rests with the
trial judge. For a detailed explanation, see supra Part I.
141. Panetti's attorneys refer to this as the "April Fools' Day Revelation," since Panetti
stopped taking his medication in April 1995 before his trial began in September 1995. The
court did not order forcible medication to restore Panetti to competency, and thus, he was
free to refuse his medication at any time during the pre-trial period. See Author's Notes,
dated June 23, 2011 (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
142. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937.
143. When a trial court accepts a defendant's motion to represent himself, the court will
often appoint standby or advisory counsel for the defendant, particularly if the defendant
faces serious, complex charges. The list of infamous defendants who have had standby
counsel includes Jack Kevorkian, John Allen Muhammad, Zacarias Moussaoui, and Ted
Kaczynski. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the
Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 676 (2000).
144. Panetti killed his mother-in-law and his father-in-law while he held his wife and
daughter captive, forcing them to watch the killings. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.03(a)(7)(A) (West 2011) (defining capital murder as multiple murders in the same
transaction).
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the jury and often appeared to be in a kind of trance. 145 The general
conclusion at the close of the trial, in which the jury found Panetti guilty
and sentenced him to death, was that the trial had been a farce and a true
"mockery of self-representation.,,146 Within two months of the close of his
trial, the trial court concluded that, although he had been competent to stand
trial and represent himself, Panetti was incompetent to waive his right to
state habeas counsel. 147
That Panetti proceeded to trial, representing himself with standby
counsel on capital murder charges, severely eroded the moral dignity of the
judicial process. All of Panetti's presentations to the j~, in both the guilt
and sentencing phases, were rambling and incoherent. 1 8 He dressed as a
cowboy throughout the trial and attempted to subpoena President John F.
Kennedy, Jesus Christ, and Pope John Paul II, among hundreds of other
unavailable witnesses with no relevant knowledge. Moreover, the reliability
of the adjudication l49 was in serious doubt. First, Panetti had a strong, valid
claim that he was insane at the time of the offense but was unable to present
the defense in any effective way because of his own mental illness and lack
of legal training. Second, one juror claimed in an affidavit following the

145. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936. Most of the specific infonnation about how Panetti acted
at trial is omitted from the Court's record in Panetti v. Quarterman. Greg Wiercioch,
counsel for Mr. Panetti before the Court on his final, successful appeal, provided wonderful
details from the trial record. See Author's Notes, dated June 23, 2011 (on file with
Tennessee Law Review).
146. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. The Court has not addressed standards for competency during the appellate and
habeas stages of a criminal trial, though it is hard to imagine that it would set a higher
standard than that for adjudicative competence. See generally Mae C. Quinn,
Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 259 (2009) (arguing for
such a standard that would improve client-centered representation).
148. I am grateful to Dr. Lillian Tidier for teaching me the tenn "word salad," used by
forensic psychiatrists and psychologists to indicate that a patient is speaking words known in
the English language while putting the words together in a wholly incoherent way. The
inflection and tone may resemble common, spoken language, but on examination the words,
as strung together, have no meaning.
149. The Court's traditional reliability doctrine is embodied most plainly in the
requirement that the prosecutor prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469
(1895); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880). In the capital context, reliability is
usually addressed in sentencing issues. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)
(holding that "[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance
to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression oflack of remorse for their crimes"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978) (holding that any "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite offactors
which may call for a less severe penalty" is "unacceptable and incompatible with the
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
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conviction and death sentence that the jury would not have sentenced
Panetti to death if he had been represented by counsel. 150 Specifically, the
juror claimed that the jury believed that Panetti was severely mentally ill,
and that his conduct in the courtroom scared the jurors into believing that
death was the only option. 151 Through all levels of appellate and habeas
review, no court has yet addressed the overarching issue of Panetti's
competency to stand trial. 152 Instead, Panetti's competency to be executed
while he sat on death row became the paramount issue, and the Court
ultimately allowed Panetti the full opportunity to litigate the issue of his
competency to be executed. 153
The post-Jackson evolution of the interpretation and application of the
competency doctrine allowed for the spectacle of the Panetti trial, and
Panetti's case provides an all-too-familiar example of a capital trial of a
marginally competent defendant that is devoid of moral dignity. Treating
the marginally competent Panetti as categorically exempt from execution
would, at least, preserve some of the dignity that due process demands in
the face of a potential death sentence.

150. Affidavit of Preston Douglas.
151. This is typical conduct for death-qualified jurors. For an overview of the
scholarship on the effect of death-qualified jurors on the likely success of the insanity
defense or the mental retardation determination, see Dillard, And Death Shall Have No
Dominion, supra note 43, at 1001-04. If the assertion of the Panetti juror is true, it
demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the required consideration that the capital jury must
give mitigation and aggravation factors. Texas actually requires the capital jury to view the
sentencing evidence in favorem vitae, which gives a strong preference to capital defendants.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoe. ANN. § 932b (West 2011). It also tends to show that the Court's
worry in Atkins v. Virginia, that some defendants may be less able "to make a persuasive
showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating
factors," was legitimate for a class of mentally ill defendants as well as mentally retarded
defendants. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (holding that mentally retarded defendants should be
categorically exempt from execution).
152. No court has ever given a substantive review to the question of Panetti's
competency to stand trial. Panetti's successive appeals to the Texas courts were rejected, and
the courts did not review the competency issue. The U.S. Supreme Court twice denied
petitions for certiorari before granting and reversing on the narrow issue of executional
competence. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin
Division, heard and denied Panetti's Edwards claim, and that issue is now on appeal before
the Fifth Circuit. See Panetti v. Thaler, No. A-09-CA-774-SS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11724
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 31,2012).
153. The ultimate holding in Panetli v. Quarterman is complex and beyond the general
purview of capital defenders save for the small minority that specialize in habeas litigation.
In brief, the Court held that Panetti did have a right to litigate his claim of incompetence to
be executed in federal district court. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 935 (2007).
Panetti is currently also litigating his Indiana v. Edwards claim that he was not competent to
represent himself at trial.
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B. Forcible Medication as the Path to Competency for Seriously Mentally
III Defendants After Jackson

Psychotropic medication to treat mental illness was virtuall~ nonexistent until the mid-twentieth century. In 1948, lithium carbonate 54 was
introduced to treat the highs and lows of bipolar disorder, and in 1952,
chlorpromazine l55 was introduced to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia.
From the early 1950s to the early 1970s, a "psycho-pharmacological
revolution [occurred], as a result of which dru~s play an increasingly
important role in the treatment of mental illness,,,15 though the effect of the
drugs was '''compensatory rather than curative. ",157 While psychotropic
drugs often have severe side effects, their overall performance has been
deemed successful for helping patients.
In 1990, the Court first addressed the issue of when a state could
forcibly medicate a prison inmate in Washington v. Harper. 158 Harper is, at
its heart, a case about medicating a prison inmate to ensure his safety and
the safety of those around him and, thus, looks much like a forcible
medication case from a hospital setting. 159 The Court established a
balancing test between the inmate's "significant libem' interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,,,16 which is maranteed
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, I and the

154. See John F.J. Cade, Lithium Salts in the Treatment of Psychotic Excitement, 36
MED. J. AUST. 349 (1949).
155. See Trevor Turner, Unlocking Psychosis, 334 BRITISH J. OF MED. § 7 (2007) (Jan.
spec. ed.).
156. Winick, Psychotropic Medication, supra note 22, at 771 (citing e.g., LEO
HOLLISTER, CLINICAL USE OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DRUGS 5-6 (1973».
157. Id. at 781 (walking through the available psychotropic drugs and their intended use
during the 1970s).
158. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
159. The Court has grappled with the role of the judiciary in interfering with medical
treatment. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,609 (1979) ("Although we acknowledge the
fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, we do not accept the notion that the
shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained
specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or
administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the
nonspecialist decision maker must make a medical-psychiatric decision. Common human
experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary
proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and
treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real." (citations
omitted».
160. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw.").
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state's interest in keeping the prison environment safe. 162 The Court found
that the due process rights of prison inmates are reduced because of their
confinement and that the state may have a legitimate penological interest in
medicating an inmate with a serious mental illness who poses a danger to
himself or others. 163 As part of the balancing test, the Court required the
state to show that the medication was consistent with the inmate's medical
interests. 164
The Court first considered whether the state could forcibly medicate a
pre-trial detainee for the purpose of restoring him to competency in Riggins
v. Nevada. 165 On appeal from a capital conviction, Paul Riggins argued that
forcible psychotropic medication before and during his capital trial had
constituted due process and fair trial violations. 166 The Court adopted a
more rigorous standard in Riggins than it had in Harper, acknowledging
that the gre-trial detainee retained due process rights that were lost to the
inmate. I To medicate a pre-trial detainee, the state must show an
"overriding justification.,,168 One such justification mimics the standard for
forcibly medicating civil committees: "medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
defendant's] own safety or the safety of others.,,169 The other "overriding
justification" creates a path towards restoring a defendant to competency:
the state might be able to justify forcible medication if the medication is
medically appropriate and if the state "could not obtain an adjUdication of
[the defendant's] guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means.,,170 As is
typical, the Court specifically declined to specify how trial courts should

162. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223.
163. Id. at 227.
164. Id.
165. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
166. Id. at 130. This Article has a collateral concern for fair trial rights, as the Court in
Atkins also focuses on fair trial rights as a rationale for categorically exempting the mentally
retarded from death. See infra note 218. Fair trial rights are wide-ranging, but for the
marginally incompetent defendant they would likely include: the right to be free from trial
unless the defendant is capable of consulting with and effectively assisting his attorney,
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); the right to be an effective witness on his
own behalf, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); the right to be present during the trial
without undermining his presumption of innocence, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976); and the right to present an effective insanity defense, United States v. Weston, 206
F.3d 9, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring).
167. See Weston, 206 F.3d at 17 (Rogers, J., concurring) ("[I]t nonetheless was clear
that the Supreme Court did not simply apply the Harper standard.").
168. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
169. Id.
170. Id. This is the current posture of the prosecution against Jared Lee Loughner. See
supra note 2.
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review and balance these competing interests. 171 Scholars often note that
when the Court extends a new right, such as the right of mentally retarded
people to be categorically exempted from death, it fails to gives any
guidance as to how trial courts should implement procedures to ensure the
new right. As Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker have written, "by
essentially deregulating the procedural means of enforcing the substantive
right, the Court has undermined the ~oals of the underlying ban by creating
a substantial risk of false negatives." 2
Frankly, Riggins abandoned the question of forcible medication for pretrial defendants without determining whether restoration to competency
alone was a compelling state interest: "[w]hether a competent criminal
defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication
would render him incompetent at trial is not before us. ,,173 However, in
2003, the Court again addressed the question in Sell v. United States. 174
There, the Court set out a preference for states to look first to reasons other
than restoration to competency to justify forcible medication of pre-trial
detainees. 175 The Court designed a four-step balancing test to clarify its
doctrine when the state's sole justification for forcible medication doctrine
is restoration to competency.176 First, the state must demonstrate an
important governmental interest in bringing the defendant to trial. 177 As

171. The Court explicitly rejected strict scrutiny as the standard of review and declared
that it did not need to reach that decision, though it did employ the traditional language of
strict scrutiny review by balancing an "essential state interest" and "less intrusive
alternatives." See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136; cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973)
(holding that limitations on fundamental rights may be justified only with narrowly drawn
legislation that protects a compelling state interest).
172. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from
Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57
DEPAUL L. REv. 721, 725 (2008) (noting, specifically, that leaving the mental retardation
determination to death-qualified jurors creates a special risk).
173. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136.
174. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Sell, a licensed dentist, was charged with the non-violent
crime of insurance fraud. Id. at 169. He refused antipsychotic medication, and at the time of
his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, he had been held in pre-trial custody for six years in
an effort to restore him to competency. Id. at 169-70.
175. Id. at 181-82. I submit that there is simply no moral dignity in medicating a
defendant for the sole purpose of sending him to trial for capital murder with the goal of
execution. After the Court handed down Sell, a flurry of law reviews published student notes
and comments criticizing the opinion. See, e.g., Cameron J. Jones, Fit To Be Tried:
Bypassing Procedural Safeguards to Involuntarily Medicate Incompetent Defendants to
Death, IO ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 165 (2004); Elizabeth G. Schultz, Note, Sell-ing Your
Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication To Achieve Trial Competency in the Wake of Sell v.
United States, 38 AKRON L. REv. 503 (2005).
176. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
177. Id. at 180.
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applied in Sell, the important governmental interest may be measured
against the severity of the crime,178 in which case the state might always
satisfy the first step in a prosecution for capital murder. Second, the state
must establish that forcible medication will significantly further those
important governmental interests. 179 This step tracks the Jackson standard
for treatment to restore to competency so long as the doctors have a
reasonable expectation of success within the foreseeable future. 180 Third,
the state must establish that it likely cannot achieve its important
governmental interests through less intrusive alternatives. 181 Finally, the
medication must be medically appropriate. 182
There is a legitimate argument that the holdinfi of Sell violates the equal
protection concerns raised by the Jackson Court, 83 though the presence of
the criminal charge could be sufficient to distinguish civil committees and
pre-trial criminal detainees. For the defendant, the real concern of forcible
medication is the inability to have a fair trial. Arguably, the defendant's
best evidence of his insanity at the time of the offense would be a
presentation of that mental state during the trial. Scholars have lon§
criticized "synthetic sanity,,,184 and chemical competency to execute. I
Capital trials are especially complex in their dependency on the emotions
and intangible impressions of the jurors in the sentencing process. Showing
a mentally ill capital defendant's condition rather than calling experts to tell

178. Id. at 186 (holding that the government failed to prove the important governmental
interest at stake in prosecuting a non-violent felony).
179. Id.
180. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (requiring a "substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future").
181. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. Talk therapy and competency education programs are
the most prevalent less intrusive alternatives, and they are typically used in conjunction with
medication.
182. Id. This position is consistent with the Court's doctrine whenever medicine
interacts with the law. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (holding that a
blood test was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment so long as it was
administered in an appropriate medical manner).
183. See Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1177, 1197-1208 (2004) (explaining that imposing more risk of forcible
medication for criminal defendants than for civil committees results in the two, similarly
situated classes, being treated differently).
184. See Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?; Rethinking Competency To
Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1109
(1986) (arguing that the synthetic appearance of sanity may inhibit the mentally ill defendant
from presenting an effective insanity defense).
185. For many years, courts routinely prohibited the trial of defendants while under the
influence of psychotropic medication, resulting in a merry-go-round of medication,
restoration, removal from medication for trial, decompensation, hospitalization, and
medication. See Winick, Psychotropic Medication, supra note 22, at 772-73.
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the jury about it is an effective strategy for defense attorneys. Furthermore,
while the side effects of psychotropic medication manifest in how the
defendant feels/ 86 and thus invoke a liberty interest, they also produce
outwardly apparent conditions that may affect the jury's perception of the
defendant. 18 Nevertheless, the mentally ill defendant is left with few
options. If he refuses the medication and somehow the court deems him
competent, he will likely engage in behavior and present himself in ways
that will frighten the jury, but if he appears before the jury fully medicated,
he will likely appear as a disengaged zombie. 188
The real issue, then, mandates a simpler strategic approach. For the
capital defender, avoiding trial altogether is the best way to "win," where
"winning" is defined as avoiding death for the client. Proving insanity is
very difficult, even in cases with overwhelming evidence of long-term,
untreated mental illness. 189 Most capital defenders have a clear opinion of
their ethical obligation to the client-save his life l90-notwithstanding
criticism from others who do not en~age in capital defense representation.
When speaking of Russell Weston,1 I the famous case of an unrestorably
incompetent capital defendant, Professor Arthur Caplan, who held a chair in
Medical Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania (and was not a capital

186. Common physical side effects include ataraxia or a zombie-like feeling, sedation,
restlessness, dry mouth, and constipation. See EDWARD DRUMMOND, THE COMPLETE GUIDE
TO PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS 170-199 (2000).
187. Synthetically sane patients often appear bored and indifferent during court
proceedings, and they are often confused and unable to think clearly because of the extreme
sedation side effect. See Lawrence D. Gaughan & Lewis H. LaRue, The Right of a Mental
Patient To Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 43, 47
(1978).
188. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-38 (1992).
189. See Paul Butler, A Basic Question ofRight and Wrong: Suspect in Capitol Killings
Faces Tough Insanity Test to Stay Alive, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REp., Aug. 25, 1998, at 6
(concluding that even though Russell Weston had suffered from schizophrenia for twenty
years, he would likely have a difficult time proving that he was insane at the time of his
offense of killing two Capitol Hill police officers).
190. In his representation of Russell Weston, A.J. Kramer, then the Federal Defender
for Washington, D.C., asserted that avoiding forcible medication was part of his trial
strategy and sustained significant criticism in the press. See Anne Hull, A Living Hell or a
Life Saved? Capitol Shooter's Untreated Madness Fuels Legal and Ethical Debate, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at AI; Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, PsychOSis and Punishment: Should
the Mentally III Be Drugged So They Can Face Execution?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Mar.
26,2001, at 50.
191. Weston was forcibly medicated for 120 days, but he showed no signs of
restoration. He remains a pre-trial detainee at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner,
North Carolina.
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defender) compared denying antipsychotic medication to denying
medication for a painful physical condition. 192
Forcible medication to restore a condemned prisoner to competency
before his execution presents an even more complex thicket of moral and
ethical issues, especially for doctors. 193 The Eighth Circuit has applied the
doctrines established in Sell to the question of whether the state may
forcibly medicate a condemned prisoner to render him competent to satisfy
the Ford standard for executional competence. 194 In Singleton v. Norris, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the state's interests in executing Singleton
were greater than Singleton's liberty interests in being free from
psychotropic medication and that the medication was the least intrusive,
medically appropriate means for restoring him to competency for
execution. 195 The dissent raised the common existential issue of whether
"synthetic sanity" is the true competency that the Ford Court required for
execution/ 96 as well as the more provocative issue of whether doctors
treating mentally ill patients awaiting execution were in fact violating their
own medical ethical standards. 197 This dilemma-having to choose between
treating the patient and thus, condemning him to death, or leaving him
untreated and condemning him to "a world such as [the defendant's1, filled
with disturbin§ delusions and hallucinations,,198-has garnered the attention
of physicians. 9
Some states have resolved the forcible medication issue in favor of the
capital defendant. In Maryland, for example, if the reviewing court finds
that the defendant is incompetent to be executed, his sentence must be

192. ABC News Nightline: Insanity in the Courtroom: Russell Weston Denied
Medication So He Won't Be Competent to Stand Trial (ABC television broadcast Jan. 23,
2001); see Aimee Feinberg, Note, Forcible Medication of Mentally III Criminal Defendants:
The Case of Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., 54 STAN. L. REv. 769, 780 (2002).
193. See Kursten B. Hensl, Restoring Competency for Execution: The Paradoxical
Debate Continues with the Case of Singleton v. Norris, 5 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. & PRAC. 55,
57 (2005) ("Is treatment that may benefit the person's short-term medical interests, but
ultimately facilitate his or her scheduled death truly in the individual's best medical
interests?") (internal citations omitted).
194. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
832 (2003).
195. Jd. at 1023-27.
196. Id. at 1033-34 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that only a cure to mental illness,
rather than a temporary reprieve from its symptoms, can satisfy the Ford requirement for
executional competence).
197. Id. at 1036.
198. ld. at 1037.
199. See Richard E. Redding & Kursten Hensl, Do No Harm: Should We Medicate To
Execute?, 130 COMMONWEAL 9-10 (2003) (examining the conflict between the legal
obligation of treating psychiatrists to order forcible medication to condemned prisoners and
the overarching obligation of the doctor to "do no harm").
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commuted to life without parole?OO South Carolina and Louisiana have both
held that forcible medication for execution is unconstitutionaeo l However,
the question of whether due process protects a severely mentally ill capital
defendant from forcible medication to restore him to competency for trial or
for execution remains unanswered by the Court.

C. Parsing the Dusky Standard in the Post-Jackson Era
Professor Bonnie's theory of competenc~ in criminal defense has been
widely accepted by scholars and courts 02 as representing the best
understanding and explanation of the terse, two-part Dusky test. In the postJackson era, most scholars focus on the "rational understanding" to assist
counsd03 component of the Dusky competency test,204 which requires that
the defendant have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."zo5 Most of that work
addresses the different levels of competency necessary to stand trial, plead
guilty, or waive counsel in favor of self-representation and the theories that
support abolition of competency hearings when it is not in the best interest
of the defendant to be relegated to the mental health system. 206 Scholars

200. See MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. §§ 3-904(c), (h)(2) (West 2009).
201. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766 (La. 1992) ("The punishment intended for
Perry is severely degrading to human dignity. . . . [H]e will be forced to linger for a
protracted period, stripped of the vestiges of humanity and dignity usually reserved to death
row inmates, with the growing awareness that the state is converting his own mind and body
into a vehicle for his execution. In short, Perry will be treated as a thing, rather than a human
being, and deliberately subjected to 'something inhuman, barbarous' and analogous to
torture."); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993).
202. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008) (citing N. POLYTHRESS ET
AL., ADWDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MAcARTHUR SruDJES 103 (2002».
203. This aspect of the competency requirement is, perhaps, more difficult for seriously
mentally ill defendants to master because it is much harder to "teach" than the facts
necessary to show a rationale and factual understanding of the proceedings. Competency
education programs focus on the defendant's rationale and factual understanding of the
proceedings. Course material often covers the number of jurors in a trial and the requirement
of unanimity, the options for pleading guilty, not guilty, and no contest, and the role of the
judge and the lawyers.
204. See, e.g., Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 552-60; Richard 1. Bonnie et

aI., DeciSion-Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the
Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48, 53 (1996);
Johnston, Setting the Standard, supra note 33, at 1617-18 (footnote omitted); Maroney,
supra note 45, at 1376; Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 62, at 618-19 (citing
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam».
205. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 542, 554; Johnston, Setting the
Standard, supra note 33, at 1610, 1614, 1624; Maroney, supra note 45, at 1380-84; Winick,
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often focus on the defendant's interest in the competency hearing and
finding, while paying little attention to the societal interest at stake in the
competency determination207 because in the vast majority of criminal cases,
the defendant's interests may be best served by a finding of competency
and a tria1. 208
Professor Bonnie's complex theory of the requirements for the
competence to assist counsel prong of the adjudicative competency
standard focuses on the defendant's ability to appreciate the seriousness of
the circumstances and to communicate necessary, relevant information to
help in the preparation of a defense?09 Bonnie focuses on criminal
defendants who are represented by counsel and notes that, even with
counsel, criminal defendants are responsible for making some choices on
their own; as such, defendants must also have a suitable degree of
decisional competence?1O Criminal defendants are uniquely responsible for
making three decisions in every criminal trial: whether to plead guilty or
not guilty, whether to have a jury or a bench trial, and whether to testify.2I1
These specific decisions present the threshold requirement that the
defendant possess the ability to make reasoned decisions, but decisional
competence extends beyond these three fundamental choices for each
defendant. The ABA Model Rules authorize the attorney to make
"decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct crossexamination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be
made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions . . . after consultation
with the client.,,212 Thus, decisional competence is an inherent, fundamental
part of the overall determination of whether a defendant is competent to
stand trial. 213

Reforming Incompetency, supra note 62, at 622.
207. Professor Bonnie elaborates on the societal interests, such as preserving the moral
dignity of the process by prohibiting the prosecution and conviction of incompetent
defendants who neither understand the nature of the wrongdoing nor the punishment thereof.
Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 21, at 426-27.
208. The reverse is true for the capital defendant with a serious mental illness.
209. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 562-63.
210. Id. at 552-54 (referring to the defendant's ability to engage in legally valid
decision-making which is part of the autonomy justification for the incompetency doctrine).
Bonnie offers a hypothetical criminal justice system where the defendant would not be
allowed to represent himself or plead guilty and where all decisions regarding the defense
would be left to the attorney. Id. In this hypothetical system, the defendant would have no
autonomy and thus, would not need to demonstrate any degree of decisional competence. Id.
211. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (explaining that the criminal
defense lawyer "shall abide" by the defendant's decisions regarding his plea, his choice of
jury or bench trial, and his choice to testify).
212. ABA STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 4-S.2(b) (1986) (emphasis added).
213. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 21, at 428 (noting
that "competence to stand trial" is a misnomer since 90% of criminal cases do not proceed to
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In order to provide meaningful assistant to counsel, "[a] robust
conception of adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky
standard must ask whether a criminal defendant has the capacity to
participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required of her,
and a sound assessment of such capacity requires careful attention to both
the cognitive and emotional influences on rational decision-making.,,214 The
inquiry must be whether the defendant can make reasoned choices in light
of the potential risks.215
Dignity and autonomy are likely in tension when any criminal
defendant waives counsel and elects to represent himself,z16 and in Indiana
v. Edwards,217 the Court held that a defendant must demonstrate a higher
degree of competency to waive counsel and represent himself at trial. 218 The
Court characterized Edwards and other hypothetically similar defendants as
"insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition
stands helpless and alone before the COurt.,,219 Given this characterization, it
is fair to conclude that an Edwards defendant-one who has been found
competent to stand trial but incompetent to represent himself, a borderlinecompetent or gray-area competent defendant-must present at the lowest
end of the acceptable spectrum for competent defendants. 220

trial).
214. Maroney, supra note 45, at 1376.
215. Bonnie uses the phrase "ability to make reasoned choices" when describing the
necessary capacity for a pro se defendant to proceed to trial without counsel. But even those
defendants who are represented by counsel must be able to make the three choices that are
required of criminal defendants. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 579 (noting
that pro se defendants might need some additional abilities for self-representation to avoid
making a mockery of the proceedings).
216. This is a common practice for mentally ill capital defendants, who often, in the
face of possible execution, develop a serious distrust of their attorneys. The symptom of
delusional beliefs for the mentally ill defendant often overtakes all other reason and leads the
defendant to believe that he alone is the only person capable of preparing a defense, a
defense which is usually irrational. See Paula Shapiro, Comment, Are We Executing
Mentally Incompetent Defendants Because They Volunteer To Die?: A Look at Various
States' Implementation of Standards of Competency To Waive Post-Conviction Review, 57
CATH. U. L. REv. 567 (2008).
217. 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
218. Id. at 174-76 (holding that "the spectacle" of a trial without counsel could be
humiliating to the defendant, and as such, the standard for competency to proceed to trial
without counsel was higher than the standard for competency to proceed to trial with
counsel). A concern for courtroom decorum, orderly presentation of evidence and witnesses,
and the advancement of relevant legal arguments drove the Court's decision. Id.
219. Id. at 177 (quoting Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954)). This is one of
several instances where the Court uses the term "insane" to mean mentally ill or, in the
common vernacular, crazy, rather than for its legal meaning. See infra note 291.
220. Professor Bonnie uses the phrase "marginally competent" to describe the standard
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The Court declined to define a specific standard for decisional
competence, and as a result, it did not define marginal competency. But in
identifying the conditions that will impede a defendant from representing
himself, the court included these examples: "disorganized thinking, deficits
in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities,
.
anxIety,
and other common symptoms 0 f severe menta1 1'11ness. ,,221
Professor Lea Johnston has added a great deal to the discourse in her effort
to define the parameters of the borderline-competent defendant described in
Edwards. 222 She argues that defendants should not be allowed to represent
themselves if so doing "poses a grave threat to the reliability or fairness of
the proceeding.,,223 I maintain that when there is a grave threat to reliability
and fairness of capital proceedings, based on a defendant's marginal
competence to proceed, that defendant should be categorically exempted
from receiving a death sentence. 224
In some instances, defendants who were competent to stand trial may
become incompetent while on death row,22S but for those who are deemed
marginally competent during the competency assessment, moral dignity
should demand that the court determine executional competence before the
trial begins. Trying a madman who does not understand the nature or
connection of the proposed punishment is no less morally offensive than
executing that same madman. Executional competence has been criticized
as "the new insanity defense,,,226 available to those capital defendants who
failed to convince the jury of their insanity or of the mitigating nature of
their mental illness, but who may still receive a reprieve from execution if
they are found not competent to be executed.227 Though there have been
several instances of gubernatorial commutations of death sentences for

that trial courts employ when finding mentally retarded defendants competent to stand trial.
Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 21, at 422-23; cf -Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340-41 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's
extension of the early common law prohibition on exempting mentally retarded defendants
to those who were "mildly mentally retarded.")
221. Edwards, 554 U.S at 176 (quoting Brief for the American Psychiatric Association
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 26) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See Johnston, Representational Competence, supra note 35, at 579 (establishing a
normative theory for representational competence that focuses on the defendant's rational
decision-making ability).
223. Id. at 526.
224. See infra Part IV.
225. See generally Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140
AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1986) (studying the severe psychiatric reactions that death row
inmates had to austere, isolated living conditions).
226. Alan A. Stone, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, SEPT. 1986,
at 1.
227. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934-35 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986).
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extremely mentally ill defendants,228 the courts are much less likely to
reverse a death sentence for a seriously mentally ill defendant. 229
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a prisoner who has
been sentenced to death if that prisoner is "insane.,,23o While the core focus
of the Court in Ford v. Wainwright is retributive in nature,231 the original
common law prohibition stemmed from the right of the condemned to
continue to argue his innocence and seek a pardon from his death
sentence.232 While the Ford plurality disregarded the need for an
assessment of the condemned prisoner's ability to assist counsel, the larger
concern in the capital context is whether the defendant was competent to be
executed before the trial began.
D. How the Dusky Standards Should Apply to a Marginally Competent
Defendant in a Capital Trial
The Court has accepted that proceedings in which marginally
competent defendants who lack the capacity to make the kinds of decisions
necessary to represent themselves are allowed to represent themselves
cannot maintain any shred of moral dignity.233 Defining the marginally

228. See, e.g., Official Site of the Governor of Virginia, Statement of Governor Kaine
on the Scheduled Execution ofPercy Levar Walton, June 9, 2008.
229. The case of Pernell Ford garnered a good deal of public support for commutation.
Ford was clearly, actively in the throes of mental illness when he acted as his own attorney;
he asked the trial court to bring the victims into the courtroom so God could resurrect them.
He was executed, nonetheless, in 2000. See Spencer Hunt, Standard of Insanity at Issue,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2001.
230. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. The Court found that the condemned prisoner must
possess the present ability to experience retribution-understand the scheduled execution
and the relationship between the prisoner's capital offense and his execution. Id. at 417-18.
231. See id. at 407. The Court examined three core rationales for the prohibition against
executing the incompetent: it offends humanity and serves as no example to others, madness
is its own punishment, and it is "uncharitable to dispatch ... [the unfit] into another world."
Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 6
(6th ed., London, W. Rawlins 1680); SIR JOHN HAWLES, REMARKS ON THE TRVAL OF
CHARLES BATEMAN, in 3 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF STATE-TRVALS AND PROCEEDINGS
UPON IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER MISDEMEANORS 651, 653 (Thomas
Salmon ed., London, Timothy Goodwin 1719)).
232. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24-25 ("[A]nd if, after judgment, he becomes
of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the
English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in
stay of execution.").
233. Beyond actual moral dignity or the appearance thereof, the accuracy of any
conviction would call into question the entire criminal justice system. See Johnston, Setting
the Standard, supra note 33, at 1609 (describing the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, a pro se
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competent may be a slightly easier task for a trial court in light of the
Court's holding in Indiana v. Edwards. However, the need for moral
dignity is increased in the capital trial because "death is different.,,234 By
setting a spectrum between the generalized standard of adjudicative
competency (with counsel) and representational competency (proceeding
pro se), the Court has acknowledged that some defendants are less
competent than others. Those who are less competent will always be forced
to accept counsel, but counsel in a capital case is an insufficient proxy to
protect the marginally competent defendant, and indeed all of society, from
the moral indignity of his capital trial.
The Edwards Court is peculiarly concerned with the appearance of
moral dignity in the trial proceedings, and in most cases, a lawyer can quiet
the disruptive behavior of a defendant. Indeed, one fair reading of Edwards
would be that no capital defendant would likely ever be competent to
represent himself. 235 It is hard to imagine a post-Edwards capital case
involving a defendant suffering from some mental health issues that
interfered with his competence to stand trial, at least insofar as determined
by the court-ordered assessment, where the trial court would fmd the
defendant competent to waive counsel and represent himself?36 Edwards
has closed the door on the autonomy issue for a capital defendant who,
while competent to stand trial, nonetheless "stands helpless and alone
before the court.,,237 On balance, the need to destigmatize people with
mental illness by allowing their autonomy for self-representation at trial
will not '''affirm' the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity
to conduct [a] defense without the assistance of counsel,,238 in a capital
prosecution. In capital cases, the need for dignity in the courtroom must
trump the dignity of autonomous self-representation by a defendant who is
no more than marginally competent. 239

defendant "of borderline mental capacity").
234. Ford,477U.S.at411.
235. Scott Panetti, who waived counsel and represented himself, is now in litigation
over his Edwards claim. Author's Notes, Interview with Greg Wiercioch, Counsel for Scott
Panetti, June 23, 2011 (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
236. But the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin
Division recently concluded that Scott Panetti was not marginally or borderline competent
and denied his Edwards claim. See Panetti v. Thaler, Case No. A-09-CA-774-SS (Jan. 31,
2012). This issue is presently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
237. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (quoting Massey v. Moore, 348
U.S. 105, 108 (1954)).
238. Id. at 176 (quoting McKaskie v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)).
239. I appreciate the motives of Professors Christopher Slobogin, Bruce Winick, and
others in their extended efforts to theorize ways that trial courts should scrutinize
competency decisions to allow for autonomy even for those who are only marginally
competent, but I find no place for those theories in a capital prosecution. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
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The ability to assist counsel in prer,aring an adequate defense operates
as a literal lifeline in capital litigation. 40 Because of the complexity of all
capital litigation, defendants rely on their attorneys for making critical
decisions, and whether consciously or not, attorneys engage in surrogate
decision-making. 241 An often-overlooked factor in the competency
determination is the seriousness and complexity of the charges;242 that is,
trial courts cannot employ a fixed standard for determining competency but
must rather examine each defendant in the context of his own trial to see if
he is able to assist counsel. 243 Nowhere is this demand more pressing than in
a capital case. 244
However, using counsel to hide the marginal competence of the
defendant is not a suitable solution in the capital trial. 245 Capital defendants
need a higher degree of competency-intellectual and emotional-to
participate with counsel in a more complex trial. For a capital defendant to
assist counsel in the preparation of an adequate defense, the capital
defendant needs to engage in other collaborative decision-making-such as
how to present mitigation evidence, how to characterize mental illness, and

DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 20 (2006); Erica Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The
Criminal Defendant's Right To Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1147, 1178-79 (2010)
(arguing that only the defendant can prioritize the competing risks of going to trial and
sentencing exposure and that he should be allowed to make decisions based on the
infonnation he receives from counsel, regardless of his ability to process and make rationale
choices); Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 62, at 618-22.
240. See Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife ofFord and Panetti: Execution Competence
and the Capacity To Assist Counsel, 53 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 309, 314, 346-47 (2009) (quoting
Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Panetti v.
Quartennan, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407».
241. See Bonnie, Beyond Dusky, supra note 44, at 546-47. Surrogate decision-making
covers only those narrow aspects of the litigation reserved for the defendant's decisionbeing tried by a judge or a jury and testifying or remaining silent. Id.
242. See GRISSO, supra note 32, at 87.
243. Id.
244. The best evidence of the increased need for expertise and high-level functioning
comes through the states' decisions to require that capital defenders have more experience
and training than other criminal defenders. It follows that if counsel needs to have a more
refined ability to handle the complexity of the capital trial, so too must the capital defendant.
See Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and
Analysis of State Indigent Defenses Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible
Defendants, 37 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1617, 1640 (1996); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L.
REv. 329,357-58 (1995).
245. The specific role of counsel in capital defense is beyond this scope of this Article
and is the subject of a work-in-progress. In that work, I argue that using capital counsel to
quiet the marginally competent defendant merely makes the adjudicative process seem to
have moral dignity, which is insufficient for a capital prosecution where death is a possible
sentence.
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how to determine mental retardation-in order to have a fair trial that
satisfies the societal goals of capital punishment.
The complexity of the bifurcated trial offers the first challenge for the
marginally competent defendant. Appreciating the strategy of engaging in a
"slow plea" during the guilt/innocence phase rather than raising marginal or
even strong defenses is very difficult for all capital defendants; staying
focused on the goal-a life sentence-requires an understanding of the
death-qualified jury and its tendency to disregard innocence claims once
death-qualified. Experience and training prepares the capital defender for
this complex strategy, but the capital defendant does not have the benefit of
training and experience. Moreover, the marginally competent capital
defendant likely suffers a mental illness that will render him paranoid,
especially as regards his counsel, so "relying" on the advice of counsel to
understand traditional capital defense strategy may be impossible for the
marginally competent defendant.
In most capital trials, the majority of the preparation is directed towards
the sentencing phase, where the jury will be given evidence to prove
aggravating factors from the prosecution and mitigation evidence from the
defense. In preparation for the mitigation case, the capital defendant must
work closely with defense investigators and mitigation experts to reveal
information about himself and his family that could persuade a jury to opt
for a life sentence. Clarity of thought and sheer recollection could be
problematic for the highly medicated, marginally competent capital
defendant. But the need to access a deep well of emotional strength to
reveal family secrets and confront personal flaws will likely flummox the
marginally competent capital defendant to a degree that he is worthless in
his contributions to the defense team. 246 Intense questioning from mental
health experts often exhausts capital defendants who are competent, but for
those who are only marginally competent, stretching their native intellect,
quieting the delusions of their severe mental illness, and overcoming the
debilitating side effects of psychotropic medication is nearly impossible.
The Edwards Court seems to regard the lawyer as moderator-someone
who can keep the defendant quiet and attentive, help maintain decorum, and

246. One of the better examples of a defendant reaching the emotional level necessary
to help his attorneys comes from the film DEAD MAN W ALKlNG, which chronicles the final
days of a convicted murderer awaiting death. During a counseling session with his spiritual
advisor, the condemned man achieves a breakthrough in his ability to confront his crime,
contemplate his intoxication during the crime, and consider how his life lead him to commit
the capital crime. See DEAD MAN WALKlNG (Havoc 1995). Had this breakthrough happened
during the preparation for trial, it would have offered a wealth of relevant material for the
sentencing phase. See SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN W ALKlNG: AN EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (detailing the mental and
emotional preparation of two condemned men as they prepare for execution).
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keep the proceedings moving along smoothly.247 But accepting this as part
of the role of the capital defender may not benefit the capital defendant.
Telling a capital defendant to be quiet in order to hide his chronic delusions
and chaotic thinking during pre-trial proceedings may stifle the best
evidence that the defendant is not competent to stand trial. Furthermore, if
the lawyer works to stifle the outward manifestation of severe mental
illness, the jury may not find persuasive any assertion that the defendant's
severe mental illness should serve as a compelling mitigating factor that
demands a life sentence.
More troubling, though, is the work-around that the defense team often
creates to prepare for a capital trial with a marginally competent defendant.
The fact of severe mental illness in the defendant often crafts the outline of
the narrative that lawyers are likely to complete with evidence from
mitigation and mental health experts. Whether arguing insanity in the guiltinnocence phase or the diminished capacity caused by severe mental illness
in the sentencing phase, attorneys often piece the theory together from
experience rather than from direct information and assistance from the
defendant. In fact, marginally competent defendants might be so unhelpful
as to become an afterthought in preparation and actually become a burden
by forcing counsel to spend precious time repetitively explaining strategy
and evidence to the defendant rather than consulting with the defendant in
making those decisions.
IV. A CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION OF THE MARGINALLY COMPETENT FROM
EXECUTION

The competency doctrine must be flexible and applied in degrees
according to each individual defendant. As one commentator has stated,
"the purpose of the law is not to attempt to compensate all the inevitable
disparities in innate abilities among defendants, but to identify those
instances where the purposes of incompetency law are most directly
relevant.,,248 In this section, I will look closely at the Court's rationales for
declaring that mentally retarded defendants-even those with mild mental
retardation-must be categorically exempted from execution. Marginally
competent capital defendants share profound similarities with mentally
retarded defendants in terms of how desert-based theories of punishment
and trial-related inadequacies make them unsuited for a capital trial and a
death sentence. But, the mentally retarded are less likely to be restored to
competency than marginally competent defendants,249 leaving marginally

247. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
248. Note, Incompetency, supra note 94, at 459.
249. I use the term "restore" for consistency, but properly, mentally retarded defendants
are treated to "gain" competency, and mentally retarded defendants, once found
incompetent, are unlikely to gain competency through traditional restoration efforts. See
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competent defendants at risk for execution when a lesser sentence would
have been more appropriate. Because the two groups share relevant
qualities, marginally competent defendants should, if competent to stand
trial, be categorically exempted from execution. 250
The defendant-specific proportionalitl51 jurisprudence that the Court
has established for mentally retarded and juvenile capital defendants offers
an excellent playbook on why the prosecution and execution of marginally
competent capital defendants is devoid of moral dignity and violates due
process. In Atkins v. Virginicl 52 and Roper v. Simmons,253 the Court
declared that the execution of a mentally retarded or juvenile defendant was
unconstitutiona1. 254 In the canon of capital punishment jurisprudence, Atkins
and Roper are proportionality cases: '''it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense. ",255 The Court relied on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, as viewed through the modem
common law constitutionalist lens of a maj ority of the sitting justices,256 to
conclude that mentally retarded and juvenile defendants are "categorically
less culpable than the average criminal.,,257

Scott, supra note 74, at 39.
250. Arguments have been made that the Court's categorical exclusion of juveniles and
the mentally retarded from execution should be extended to include seriously mentally ill
and brain-injured defendants. See, e.g., Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution:
Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1493, 1518-27 (2009) (discussing a
categorical bar to executing defendants suffering from serious mental disease or defect);
Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean/or People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L.
REv. 293 (2003); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785 (2009).
251. I use this term to describe the rule from Atkins and Roper that certain defendants
must be categorically exempted from execution; due to their condition, execution can never
be a proportionate punishment for juveniles and mentally retarded defendants. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,567 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311 (2002).
252. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
253. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
254. /d. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
255. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910») (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's proportionality review has generally
focused on specific crimes. For example, the Court has declared that a death sentence cannot
be proportionate to crimes that do not involve the death of another. See Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (holding that a death sentence is not proportionate to
the crime of rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (holding that a
death sentence is not proportionate to the crime of rape of an adult woman).
256. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[O]bjective evidence, though of great importance, [does]
not 'wholly determine' the controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on ... the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment.'" (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
257. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
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Though the Court declared that mentally retarded and juvenile
defendants must be "categorically excluded from execution,,,258 it declined
to implement any procedure to ensure such categorical exclusion for
mentally retarded defendants, anticipating some difficulty in the future "in
determining which offenders are in fact retarded.,,259 But a comprehensive,
close reading of Atkins and Roper reveals that the Court employed a similar
rule and rationale to reach its conclusion that mentally retarded and juvenile
defendants should be categorically excluded from execution,260 and, as
such, trial courts would be justified in ensaging in similar procedures261 to
ensure compliance with the Court's rule? Here, the focus is why mentally
retarded defendants, and by extension marginally competent capital
defendants, should be categorically exempted from death-eligibility rather
than how to accomplish the task.

A. Rationales to Support the Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded
Defendants from Execution
The Court identifies two reasons for exempting mentally retarded
defendants from execution: the lack of penological purpose in death and the
risk of an unfair tria1. 263 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion offers the best

258. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 ("A majority of States
have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile[ s] ... and we now hold this is
required by the Eighth Amendment.").
259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
260. Reading Atkins in the context of Roper is a novel scholarly argument.
261. I have previously argued that trial courts must make a pre-trial mental retardation
determination to achieve due process in the Court's directive for a categorical exclusion. See
Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion, supra note 43, at 974 (asserting that trial courts
must view the evidence of mental retardation in favorem vitae, which requires a pre-trial
determination).
262. Examining the strength of the right to be exempted from the imposition of the
death penalty might influence the type of procedure necessary to guarantee that right. The
evidence of an evolving standard of decency towards protecting the mental1y retarded from
execution was stronger than the evolving standard of decency towards protecting juveniles
from execution. The rate of states abolishing the death penalty for mentally retarded
defendants was moving at a faster clip than the pace of change for juveniles. Between Penry
and Atkins, sixteen states changed their laws to exempt the mentally retarded from
execution. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. In contrast, only five states moved to exempt
juveniles from execution between Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Roper, the
case that overturned Stariford. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 380 (1989). This begs analysis of whether the mentally retarded deserve a stronger
procedural protection to secure the guarantee. Arguably, under the Court's majoritarian,
evolving standards of decency analysis, society is more prepared to categorically exclude
mentally retarded defendants from execution than it is prepared to exclude juveniles.
263. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
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explanation for the former?64 As support for the latter, the Court delineates
anticipated pre-trial problems, such as susceptibility to giving false
confessions; trial problems, such as an inability to assist counsel or serve as
a useful witness for the defense; and sentencing problems, such as a jury's
disregard for mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 265
The core values of the criminal Justice system demand that each
punishment serve some societal goal. 66 The Court has embraced two
theories of punishment as justification for execution: "retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.,,267 Unless execution
"measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and
hence an unconstitutional punishment.,,268 For retribution, the Court has
developed its narrowing jurisprudence by examining the nature of the crime
to determine whether the defendant had committed one of the most serious;
for example, the Court has excluded from the sanction of the death penalty
all crimes where the victim did not perish?69 Even among murderers, the
Court excludes from death those crimes that do not reflect, "a
consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder.,,27o Based on the cognitive and rational deficiencies in the mentally
retarded defendant, the Court has concluded that the mentally retarded
defendant has decreased culpability and, thus, is less deserving of the
ultimate sanction than those defendants without impairment. 271 Because this
exclusion is a categorical, rather than a case-by-case, assessment, the Court
concluded that no person who is mentally retarded would ever be culpable
enough to deserve death.272
To satisfy a deterrence theory of punishment, the Court has looked to
see whether the imposition of a death sentence in one case will affect "the
'cold calculus that precedes the decision' of other potential murderers.,,273

264. !d. at 337, 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 320-21 (majority opinion).
266. The classic theories of punishment are deterrence, retribution, public safety
(incapacitation), and education (rehabilitation). See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 101 (7th ed. 2001).
267. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
268. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584,592 (1977)).
269. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008); Coker, 433 U.S. at 598; Coker,
433 U.S. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
270. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,433 (1980).
271. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
272. Id. I use the vague "to be" here because the Court gives no direction on how a trial
court should determine if a defendant is mentally retarded, whether defendant or government
should bear the burden of proving or disproving mental retardation, or when this
determination should be made.
273. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
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The Court has concluded that potential murderers who are mentally
retarded lack the capacity to engage in the logical reasoning necessary to
connect their impulsive conduct with a future punishment of death. 274
Moreover, the Court has concluded that potential murderers who are not
mentally retarded will not experience less deterrence if mentally retarded
murderers are exempted from the imposition of death.275
The characteristics of mental retardation defined by the Court that
affect retributive theory analysis are relevant to the mentally retarded
defendant's capacity before the crime, during the crime, and at the time of
execution.276 Mental retardation operates like "insanity-lite" for the Atkins
Court.277 The Court recognizes that some mentally retarded defendants will
not be able to distinguish right from wrong, the classic element under the
narrow M'Naghten insanity test. 278 But for those mentally retarded
defendants who will not meet the M'Naghten standard for being found
insane at the time of the offense,279 the symptoms of "diminished capacities
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others" justify an
exemption from the imposition of the death penalty.280 Under a desert-based
theory of punishment, for a symptom, such as a diminished capacity to
control impulses, to cause the defendant to be exempted from execution

274. Id. at 320.
275. Id. Most critics think that the theory of deterrence is an exercise in theory with no
practical effect. That the Court engages the theory, to seemingly absurd conclusions, secures
the analysis that the mentally retarded defendant is different enough, based on diagnosis
alone, to warrant an exemption from the imposition of death no matter how heinous his
crime.
276. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORlUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, STATE DEATH
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS KEy FINDINGS (2007), http://www.abanet.orglmoratoriuml
assessmentproject/keyfindings.pd£
277. Since the insanity defense is used rarely (1 %) and succeeds even less often, it
follows that the Court wanted to ease the burden of proving insanity for mentally retarded
defendants. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity
Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 375, 378 (1999).
278. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719, 722-23.
279. Juries are extremely skeptical of an insanity defense, and death-qualified juries
even more so. Even in cases with a very strong insanity claim supported by expert
testimony, juries can rely on lay evidence of how the defendant acted before, during, and
after the crime to disregard the expert testimony. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:
An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1109 (1997). I find arguments for a wholesale re-working of the insanity defense quite
persuasive. See, e.g., Christopher Siobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of
Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199 (2000).
280. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
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requires the symptom to have affected the mentally retarded defendant's
thought process at the time of his crime. 281 For example, if a defendant had
an irresistible impulse that was the product of mental retardation (i.e.,
untreatable with medication or therapy), then the defendant's thought
process was affected causing the defendant to be unable to conform his
conduct.282 Thus, retribution for the mentally retarded defendant's act is
impossible because he is unable to reflect on the quality of his act.
Moreover, a mentally retarded potential capital murderer can neither
engage in logical reasoning, nor control his irresistible impulse so that he
could contemplate the potential of a death sentence and be deterred from
committing murder.
The Atkins Court offered a second justification for the categorical
exemption of mentally retarded defendants from execution.283 The Court
found that mentally retarded defendants suffered a special risk "'that the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less
severe penalty. ",284 The Court asserted that "[ m]entally retarded defendants
may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are
typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.,,285 If mentally retarded
defendants are, in fact, "less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel,,,286 then those defendants could be described as incompetent to
stand trial where a death sentence is a possibility.287 That is, the defendant
may be competent to stand trial for capital murder but not competent to
stand trial where the possibility of a death sentence looms. 288 In short, based

281. See id. ("[T]here is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on
impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan ....").
282. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test as a Replacement
for the Special Defense ofInsanity, 42 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 523,524 (2009).
283. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
284. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
285. Id. at 320-21.
286. Id. at 320.
287. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) ("[T]he 'test
must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rationale understanding .... "').
288. This is a distinction that would be clear to any judge, prosecutor, or defense
attorney involved in a capital case, but likely deserves more explanation here. The charge of
capital murder carries two potential sentences-life or death. The crime of capital murder is
distinct from other murders in that it usually involves an additional element of proof from
the government, like the murder of a child or of a police officer. See, e.g., Omar Randi
Ebeid, Comment, Death by Association: Conspiracy Liability and Capital Punishment in
Texas, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1831, 1859, 1859 n.201 (noting that, in Arizona, determining
whether a crime is punishable by death relies upon a showing of at least one aggravating
factor, such as the murder of a police officer). Under Atkins, a mentally retarded defendant
could proceed to trial for capital murder but, if guilty, could only be sentenced to life in
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on the Court's rationale, mental retardation should serve as a reason for a
narrow finding of incompetency-the incompetency to stand trial for
capital murder where death is a potential sentence. 289
The Court's second justification for its categorical rule, exempting
mentally retarded defendants from the imposition of death, relates to the
trial itself; in this justification, the Court has created a new concept. A
mentally retarded defendant who suffers from "diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate... to engage in
logical reasoning ... and to understand the reactions of others" will be less
able to give meaningful assistance to counsel, which will affect the
defendant's ability to make a persuasive showing of mitigation, or serve as
an effective witness, because he may be seen as remorseless. 29o A critical
reading of the Court's concern demands that trial courts add a new
determination-for mental retardation-to the pre-trial competency
assessment. If a capital defendant, by virtue of his mental retardation, lacks
the ability to give meaningful assistance to counsel and help prepare a
useful, effective mitigation case, then he should not be subjected to a trial
wherein a death sentence is a possible outcome. The Court acknowledges
the mentally retarded defendant's inability to have a fair trial because of his
own deficiencies 291 and creates a remedy--exemption from death.292

prison. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002). Criminal attorneys sometimes refer
to this as "taking death off of the table." For a recent example of a trial judge removing
death as a possible penalty, see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., Judge Rules Out Death Penalty in
Police Shooting Case, CHARWTfE OBSERVER, Aug. 24, 20 I O.
289. See Davoli, supra note 45, at 317 (suggesting that if trial courts focus on the cause
of incompetency rather than the result of a finding of incompetency, the entire scheme for
determining competency to stand trial might be transformed).
290. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 320-21 (footnote omitted).
291. Id. The Atkins Court seems especially cognizant of the bad impression that a
mentally retarded defendant might give to the sentencing jury. "[They] are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for
their crimes." Id. at 321. This concern about the way in which a defendant appears to the jury
seems to cheapen the whole criminal justice process-particularly where death is a potential
sentence-for all defendants, not just those with mental retardation. The theatrics of
witnesses and lawyers has long been satirized, thus demonstrating the strategic planning
between client and lawyer to manipulate the jury into empathizing with the defendant. See
CHJTA RIvERA, When Velma Takes the Stand, on CHJCAGO: ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK (Arista
Records 1996), available at http:www.songlyrics.comlchicago-soundtracklwhen-velrnatakes-the-stand-Iyricsl ("When Velma takes the stand/Look at little Vel/See her give 'em
helllWhen she turns it on/Ain't she doing grand/She's got 'em eating out of the palm of her
hand" and "Then, I thought I'd cry. Buckets. Only I don't have a handkerchief-that's when
I have to ask for yours! I really like that part. Don't you?").
292. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. How the trial court accomplishes the categorical
exemption requires due process analysis. Id.
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Because the Atkins Court expressed a specific concern that "[m]entally
retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel,,,293 trial courts should assess mental retardation during a pre-trial
competency hearing for the capital defendant in order to ensure that no
subsequent Eighth Amendment violation occurs and makes a mockery of
the criminal justice system by undermining "the strength of the procedural
protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards.,,294 As I have
argued before,295 the inability to give meaningful assistance to counsel must
be a consideration in the competency assessment, and if the mentally
retarded defendant is not able to assist sufficiently to prepare for a capital
trial where death is a possibility, then forcing him to proceed as such
constitutes a due process violation.
B. How the Rationales Underlying Atkins and Roper Should Apply to

Marginally Competent Defendants
In Atkins, the Court acknowledges the difficulty of defining which
defendants may be mentally retarded, but it nonetheless declares that the
Eighth Amendment requires the categorical exemption of the mentally
retarded from execution?96 In fact, the Court fives scant attention to
defining the condition of mental retardation. 29 Without adopting the
definition of the American Association on Mental Retardation, the Court
offers the following definition in a footnote:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of
the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests
before age 18.298

293. Id. at 320.
294. Id. at317,321.
295. See Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion, supra note 43, at 968-81.
296. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
297. The Court has a long history of shying away from detail in mental illness cases. In
fact, it often conflates the fundamental principles of competency to stand trial and sanity,
though this might be a remnant of Blackstone's use of "idiot" to designate both those
defendants who lack the competency to stand trial and those defendants who lack the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
(discussing the Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing the insane yet assessing
whether the defendant is entitled to a competency evaluation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715 (1972); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 721-22, 725 (6th Cir. 1968);
BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *24.
298. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. Assoc. ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
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The Court identifies by incorporation the work of scholars who study
mental retardation, characteristics, or symptoms that may comprise the
diagnosis of mental retardation. 299 Using the clinical definition, the Court
seems to accept as a threshold that the mentally retarded defendant would
have "subaverage intellectual functioning [and] ... significant limitations
in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction," all
of which "became manifest before age 18.,,300 The Court declares that, "by
definition [mentally retarded defendants] have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.,,301 Among the
social and cognitive deficiencies, the Court finds "abundant evidence that
they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and
that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.,,302 Defendants
who satisfy the Atkins definition of mental retardation are ineligible for the
death penalty, regardless of whether the degree of mental retardation is
defined as mild, moderate, or severe. 303 The specific characteristics of
mental retardation become important upon examining the Court's two
reasons for exempting the mentally retarded from the imposition of the
death penalty.304
Strong arguments have been made that severely mentally ill capital
defendants and mentally retarded defendants are so similar that they should
be treated the same way insofar as both should be categorically exempted
from execution. 305 Regardless of the nature or the quality of the mental

MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed.
1992)).
299. !d. at 318 nn.23-24.
300. Id. at 318.
301. !d. (footnote omitted).
302. !d. (footnote omitted).
303. See id. at 321; see also Richard 1. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge
of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate
Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RiCH.
L. REv. 811, 822 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia's protest against the categorical exclusion
ofthose with mild mental retardation from capital punishment).
304. Some argue that the factual determination of which defendants should be
categorically excluded from execution should not be read narrowly. It seems reasonable that
the trial court should determine which defendants, in the broader sense, satisfy the Atkins
rationale that supports their exclusion from execution. This article, however, concerns itself
only with those defendants who would meet the narrow criteria of mental retardation. See,
e.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495,502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, 1., dissenting). The author,
however, agrees with the scholarship in the field that supports the categorical exclusion of
other defendants whose execution could not meet the traditional goals of deterrence and
retribution. See, e.g., Siobogin, supra note 250, at 293.
305. See, e.g., Batey, supra note 250, at 1518-27 (discussing a categorical bar to
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illness, the Court in Atkins has enumerated that the execution of those who
are less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation. 306 In the competency context, forcing a trial
on a defendant who is only marginally able to give meaningful assistance to
counsel constitutes a due process violation. Hiding that same defendantwhether mentally retarded or marginally competent-behind competent
counsel does not prevent the violation. At the heart of the matter is the
moral dignity of the process, and a process that looks acceptable because a
lawyer has tamped down the unruliness of his client is nonetheless devoid
of moral dignity.
V. CONCLUSION-RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Some have declared that the whole of capital punishment is "a moral
and practical failure.,,307 Indeed the American Law Institute (ALI), which
was largely responsible for the modem procedural framework for capital
punishment, has, after almost 50 years of "tinkering with death,,,308 voted to
discontinue its efforts. 309 Among the moral failures of capital punishment
are the trial and execution of seriously mentally ill defendants.
If we accept the premise of Atkins-that idiots and lunatics were spared
from the death penalty at the time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment
and that evolving standards of decency have led society to include the
mildly mentally retarded in today's definition of idiots and lunatics-then it
follows that those same idiots and lunatics, who would have been
incompetent to stand trial in 1789, should be spared from trial today under
an evolving standard of decency interpretation of due process.31O In the
simplest of terms, the mildly mentally retarded defendant who must be
categorically exempted from execution would, by historical definitions, also
be incompetent to stand trial. The nuances of the competency doctrine in
the past 40 years create friction in this analogy, but the underpinnings of
why idiots and lunatics were spared from trial and execution remain the
same.

executing defendants suffering from serious mental disease or defect).
306. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
307. See Adam Liptak, Group Gives Up Death Penalty Work, N.Y. TIMES, January 5,
20 I 0, at A II (quoting Professor Samuel Gross).
308. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J. dissenting)
("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.")
309. See Report of the Council to the Membership of the American Law Institute on the
Matter ofthe Death Penalty, Apr. 15,2009 (deciding to discontinue its efforts "in light of the
current intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate
system for administering capital punishment").
310. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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The dual goals of retribution and deterrence bear an illusory connection
to the prosecution and execution of seriously mentally ill defendants; the
connection is merely theory that falls apart in application. But the need of
the community to grasp retribution for heinous crimes is tangible. The
objectives underlying the belief that incompetent defendants should be
spared prosecution-moral dignity and reliability-are, likewise,
theoretical. I have great admiration for those scholars who work in the field
of forgiveness and desert-based theory, but I believe that an answer to the
conflict between society's need for retribution and the incompetent capital
defendant's right to due process may rise from a practical place.
The Court has declared that standards of decency in American society
have evolved to a place where society demands (or at least accepts) that a
capital defendant should be spared execution if the defendant is a juvenile
or mentally retarded. 3I1 Beyond the theoretical justifications that the
defendant is less culpable and retribution less effective, fair trial concerns
support the conclusion that the only way to ensure that a mentally retarded
defendant might avoid the special risk "that the death penalty will be
imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,,312 is to
categorically exempt him from execution. The seriously mentally ill
defendant, who fits within the parameters of the marginally competent,
should be spared from execution for the same reasons.
Actual due process represents the traditional fair play and substantive
justice rights deeply rooted in our country's history and tradition; it is the
United States' explicit expression of our collective decency, fairness, and
conscience. If we are to believe in the promise of actual due process, then
the marginally competent defendant may not proceed to trial where the
result might be his execution.
I propose four ways to approach the problem set out in this Article.
First, although challenging, society could reform its lust for retribution and
accept the adage that madness is punishment for the madman. Though
scholars work diligently in this area, it is hard to imagine society quickly
abandoning its desire for retribution and punishment. Despite good
arguments to the contrary,313 the Court has never seriously entertained any
adjustment to the settled incompetency doctrine. And while some juries

311. Id.
312. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.s. 586, 605 (1978).
313. See Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the
Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 66 (1972) (suggesting abolition of the incompetency
doctrine after Jackson); Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of
Costs and Benefits. and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 245-58 (1987)
(arguing that marginally competent defendants should be allowed to waive their right to be
found incompetent if proceeding to trial is in their greater interest).
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perform ably in very challenging cases,314 such is not often the case for the
death-qualified jury.
Second, the Jackson response for capital defendants could be different.
States could either ignore the Jackson directive for capital defendants315 and
wait for the court challenge to see if the approach meets constitutional
muster, or states could modify their standards for release from civil
commitment for unrestorable capital defendants. 316
Third, the trial court could conduct a trial while the defendant is
incompetent to determine if the government's case has merit. Defenses,
such as a speedy trial violation or the government's failure to offer proof on
a required element, do not require participation from the defendant, and
some affirmative defenses can be raised without the defendant's
participation. 317 There was a trend towards scholars proposing a trial on the
merits while the defendant was incompetent after two English cases318
grappled with the idea in the mid-1950s. This proposal is, of course,
squarely at odds with our long tradition of not trying incompetent
defendants.
Finally, the most straightforward way to achieve the categorical
exemption is by determining that the marginally competent capital
defendant is not competent to stand trial where death is a possible sentence.
This approach offers an immediate simplification of the overall procedure
of the capital trial by eliminating the emotionally, intellectually, and
strategically complex sentencing phase, during which the marginally
competent, seriously mentally ill defendant runs the risk of receiving a
death sentence even though the existence of his mental illness should
persuade the jury toward the less severe penalty of life without parole.
I recognize that my solutions focus mostly on public safety and
avoiding the detrimental effect on society of a competency doctrine, which,
in practice in the capital punishment arena, lacks moral dignity. I recognize

314. See Dahlia Lithwick, Trial by Fury, SLATE, July 12, 2011 (detailing how the jurors
in the Casey Anthony trial were able to push aside the public's fury at the defendant and
view the evidence to reach a not guilty verdict).
315. See. e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 (West 2011).
316. See Dillard, Without Limitation, supra note 71 (offering model legislation for the
civil commitment of unrestorably incompetent capital defendants).
317. See Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 832,845-46 (1960) (setting out a three-part plan for condUcting a trial for
an incompetent defendant, with all results from the trial sending the defendant to a hospital
for treatment rather than punishment).
318. See Regina v. Beynon, 2 Q.B. III (1957) (holding that the defendant had to be
proven "fit" for trial before he could even enter a plea); Regina v. Roberts, 2 Q.B. 329
(1954) (holding that defense counsel could proceed to trial on the general issues before
raising the incompetency issue, thus leaving the court to send the criminally responsible but
also incompetent defendant to a hospital for the criminally insane).
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that there are legitimate therapeutic concerns319 for the defendant, and I
confess that I am merely prioritizing some concerns over others. 320

319. See generally Wexler & Winick, supra note 95, at 225.
320. The comparison is more metaphoric that actual, physiological needs, such as the
need for life, are more basic than the need for self-esteem and self-actualization. See
Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 370 {I 943)
(establishing a theory to rank the hierarchy of human needs).

